MARK LILLA
if one places oneself entirely outside of the tradition to which one
belongs. And standing inside a tradition certainly affects what
one counts as "rational acceptability."
227
This is both an explanation of how rationality operates in the world
- it operates in and begins from an ongoing tradition of discourse–
and an invitation
to
join in the criticism, preservation, and extension
of the tradition that embodies that rationality.
We can only hope to produce a more rational
conception
of ra–
tionality or a better conception of
morality
if we operate from
within our tradition... ; but this is not at all to say that all is en–
tirely reasonable and well with the conceptions we now have . We
are not trapped in individual solipsistic hells, but invited to a truly
human dialogue; one which combines individuality with collec–
tive responsibility.
The foregoing passages show Putnam at his very best: having
abandoned the search for foundations, and having honestly con–
fronted the confused positions of the radical relativists, he fully com–
prehends that the only alternative is to take one's "given" tradition,
immerse oneself in it, and then modify and extend it from within. As
with Goodman, Putnam does not develop this point any further, con–
sidering the consequences of what might be called his "ontology of
tradition," and these passages I have quoted appear quite late in the
book.
In fact, Putnam's final words are rather confused. Having
carefully laid out his explanation of rationality and its exercise, he
becomes uneasy; he seems to want it to
go
somewhere. After describ–
ing our "truly human dialogue," he asks the further question, "Does
the dialogue have an ideal terminus?" How can it possibly matter,
unless Putnam still wants to find a foundation of some sort, and
hopes this "terminus" will do? The aphoristic concluding sentence is
especially ponderous: "The very fact that we speak of our different
conceptions of
rationality
posits a
GrenzbegrifJ,
a limit-concept of the
ideal tru th."
III.
I have reserved discussion of Richard Rorty's work for last
because its main subject is really the relation between professional
philosophy and culture as a whole. Someone recently said that there
