RICHARD LOWENTHAL
191
three factors together, they seem to amount both to a sense of"equi–
distance" between Washington and Moscow and to a strong tendency
towards "neutralism." But looking at the reality of the peace move–
ment, one finds that different degrees of a sense of equidistance are
indeed widespread, but that actual neutralism is confined to a sharply
circumscribed minority. A few months before the decision
to
station
the missiles was made, a serious poll suggested that 65 percent of the
West Germans would be opposed to it; but the same poll reported a
majority of 90 percent for remaining in the Atlantic alliance. How
are we to account for that?
First of all, the factor of fear, the sense of insecurity, works with
most West Germa ns
against
neutralism.
It
is indeed difficult to believe
that a country with West Germany's resources, situated in the heart
of Europe, would be more secure without allies and indeed without
the presence of American troops on its soil. True, in a situation of
unstable nuclear balance, the alliance has become potentially dan–
gerous - but the situation of an exposed neutral country would be
far more dangerous : the likelihood of its being attacked would be
greater, not smaller. While the fear animating the German peace
movement has produced strong irrational attitudes, mos.t of its mem–
bers are not
that
irrational.
Second, I said that different degrees of a sense of equidistance
between Washington and Moscow are widespread in the peace move–
ment. What I mean is that if people talk about the activities of the
superpowers in distant lands, say of Soviet occupation of Afghan–
istan and American support for the present government of El Salva–
dor, the sense of equidistance is rather high .
If
they look at the con–
duct of the Geneva negotiations by both sides, it may still be high
with a large number of people - but it is partly balanced by their
knowlege that American governments and their policies change, and
that previous American governments have conducted different pol–
icies to the undoubted great advantage of the Federal Republic.
Finally, if people talk about immediate dangers to West Germany,
there is no sense of equidistance at all: nobody fears that the Ameri–
cans will bomb West Germany. The key argument of the peace move–
ment is not that the Soviets are so peaceloving that they will never
hurt us, but that the new U. S. missiles on German soil will be their
first targets.
Third, the West Germans are well aware that the Atlantic
alliance links them not only to the United States, but to their neigh-
