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citizens? Could deep feelings of solidarity prevail for more than short
periods of time among people who have no regular, face-to-face con–
tact? And if community could be achieved under modern cond itions ,
would it be worth the probable costs in terms of liberty and in–
dividuality?
Whatever Sandel's position on these issues, it is clear that most
existing societies fall far short of his communitarian ideal. What are
the implications of his argument for societies like our own? Sandel
does not make any systematic effort to answer that question , but his
book does contain an illuminating discussion of one contemporary
problem - affirmative action. Here he argues against Ronald Dwor–
kin, whose defense of affirmative action is similar in certain respects
to Rawls' defense of the difference principle .
For Dworkin, the crucial question is whether affirmative action
violates any individual rights- in particular, whether it violates the
rights of applicants to be judged according to meritocratic criteria.
Having argued that it does not, Dworkin concludes that affirmative
action is justified as an effective means to a desirable social end. As
Sandel points out, Dworkin is able to reach this conclusion because
he assumes "that where no individual rights are at stake, social policy
is properly decided on utilitarian grounds." But Dworkin never ex–
plains why this should be so. In cases where no rights are involved,
why should "the collective ends of society as a whole ... automati–
cally prevail"? Why should I be asked to sacrifice my interests for the
sake of some greater social good?
Sandel believes it is possible to make the case for affirmative ac–
tion, but only if one adopts a view of the moral subject that is very
different from the liberal view. What we need here again is a concep–
tion of a "wider subject of possession. " When an individual is able to
acknowledge that he is indebted to a larger group for the constitution
of his own identity, he will view his assets as in some sense common
assets; since others made him the person he is, they share in his
achievements. (Do they also share in his failures, mistakes, and
crimes?) "Where this sense of participation in the achievements and
endeavors of (certain) others engages the reflective self-understand–
ings of the participants, we may come to regard ourselves ... less as
individuated subjects with certain things in common, and more as
members of a wider ... subjectivity, less as 'others' and more as par–
ticipants in a common identity... ." When a person develops such
an enlarged self-understanding, he will have a different view of the
