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which the notions of justice, fairness, and individual rights playa
central role, and which is indebted to Kant for much of its philo–
sophical foundation." Sandel hopes to demonstrate that this brand of
liberalism is deeply flawed. In developing his argument, he discusses
a number of liberal thinkers, but he is primarily concerned with one
important and influential book,
A Theory
of
Justice,
by John Rawls.
Rawls's goal is to provide an "Archimedean point" from which
to appraise the basic structure of society.
It
is crucial that the prin–
ciples of justice not be contingent upon existing desires or present
social conditions - that would leave the theory open to precisely the
sort of criticism often directed against earlier social contract theo–
rists. At the same time, the principles must have some connection to
human experience; otherwise, they would simply be arbitrary.
Rawl's search for an Archimedean point leads him to design what he
calls the original position of equality. In it we imagine a group of
mutually disinterested, rational men and women choosing principles
under which they will subsequently live. These hypothetical con–
tractees are deprived of all particular knowledge about themselves:
they know nothing about their race, sex, wants, preferences, or con–
ceptions of the good. They do have access to some very general in–
formation about how societies work, and they also understand that
there exist certain "primary goods" that are likely to be useful to a
person whatever his or her life plan.
Rawls argues that his hypothetical contractees will necessarily
choose a small set of principles of which two are especially impor–
tant: the equal liberty principle, which guarantees each person the
basic liberties of citizenship; and the difference principle, which
stipulates that social and economic inequalities are to be permitted
only when they improve the expectations of the worst off group in
society .
Sandel begins his critique by suggesting that Rawls's account of
the original position rests on a certain theory of the person, or to use
the term he prefers, a certain theory of the moral subject. According
to this theory, we are distinct individuals characterized by separate
systems of ends. Each person's identity is "given" in the sense that it
is independent of his interests, goals, or relations with others.
Human agency involves choice-of ends, interests, conceptions of
the good - not self-discovery. On this view of the person, commun–
ity is a possible aim of antecedently individuated selves, but it can–
not be a constituent or an essential ingredient of their identity.
