PARTISAN REVIEW
59
Soviet bloc, it has no value whatever, a fact well known to those in
power; thus, propaganda directed at society and the party refers less
and less frequently to ideology and concentrates instead on the na–
tional interest and raison d'etre. But this is precisely what produce8
new contradictions within the system. For, in addition to the open
propaganda, there exists, as we know, a kind of unstated propaganda
which is sometimes more important, consisting of certain ideas and
principles which cannot be spelled out in speeches or newspapers,
but which must nevertheless be communicated to society. In the
Soviet Union, it is the idea of the great power, the glory of the huge
empire that rules over a large part of the globe, more or less directly.
Imperialist ideology, in contrast to official Marxist-Leninism, can,
of course, be partially effective. But in the people's democracies, this
unspoken ideology, communicated by allusions and hints, is an ideol–
ogy designed merely to foster fear of Soviet tanks.
If
it is at all suc–
cessful, it is only because it convinces people that the Russian leaders
can easily destroy a disobedient protectorate; no finesse is needed
to drive this argument home. To an extent, both these unarticulated
ideologies - inside and outside Russia - converge; but to rely on
their convergence as a permanent basis for rule is, of course, a short–
sighted policy, not only because in each case the ideology does not
supplement, but clearly contradicts, the official Marxist one, but
also because it may achieve its goal - temporary pacification - at the
cost of arousing national animosities which seem advantageous in
periods of peace, but which can, in critical moments, be very dan–
gerous. There
is,
however, no other way out if the ruling apparatus
is to retain even minimal contact with its subjects.
Among the jokes authored by Stalin, one has become famous
~
"And how many divisions does the Pope have?" The cynicism of
this
question illustrates most eloquently the poverty of a system which
has
lost everything except its divisions (however important they may
be ),
and has forgotten that it is itself the product of a revolution that
was
victorious not because of its military force, but because of the
moral disintegration of the Czarist regime and army.
The ideological paralysis of bureaucratic socialism becomes more
and more widespread and irreversible; campaigns devoted to "ideo–
logical struggle" may invent new methods of repression, but they
cannot offer society anything but the same boring slogans. Attempts
