PARTISAN REVIEW
5b5
directly affected by the Party's policies of economic and social transforma–
tion. Working-class people brought into managerial positions could see
themselves proudly as the proletariat rising to leadership in society. For
members of the former middle classes, however, it meant political resis–
tance plus a struggle to save their own positions and often their liveli–
hoods. The industrial proletariat became more and more disaffected by
the contrast between the Party's millenial propaganda and its own actual
situation, socially improved but economically much the same as before
and politically worse. The peasantr)" made to pay the cost of indus–
trialization and herded meanwhile into collectives by an elite contemp–
tuous of the peasant's mind and way of life, had no reason to see the
regime as anything but a form of war on itself.
It was hardly surprising if the majority of this generation appeared
all too ready to trust Western rhetoric about "rolling the Soviets back."
And even when no action had followed the rhetoric, though many were
disillusioned, not a few of the oldest still kept that image of the
West as Savior: "When my grandfather was dying," a twenty-seven–
year-old artist told me in Bulgaria, "the priest was called . After the old
man had confessed and it was all over, the priest asked him if he had
anything more to say or ask. 'Tell me, father,' the old man said, 'when
do you think the Americans might be coming?' "
After Stalin's death , and as a result of subsequent political as well
as economic and social developments, the generation growing senior
achieved a degree of consolidation. Attitudes have remained largely un–
changed, and many deep hatreds are not forgotten. Most non- Com–
munists have continued to see the regime as essentially a Russian im–
position, while many Communists have remained at heart the men they
became under Stalin. But the sheer necessity of coping, along with na–
tionalism, and with the authoritarian tradition and political system, which
placed all essential responsibilities in the hands of the older age group ,
have re-created the unity of a generation.
Where non-Party experts are accepted, as in Hungary, the older
ones now hold about as many posts of importance, from village headships
to export Illanagement, as do their Party colleagues. Where they re–
mained una ccepted, many of them entered the Party to gain good jobs,
and frankly ad\·ise their children to do the same. And in all East Euro–
pean countries their power remains far greater than it is in the plural–
istic and more affluent societies of the West , because the centralism of
the economic and state machinery leaves the young little hope of promo–
tion O\'er the heads of their elders and because chi ldren also become
financially independent much later.
