370
MICHAEL HARRINGTON
Or the Movement might have picketed outside the convention
baR
in support of various programmatic demands. I would have disagreed
with this as a strategy, but an argument could be made for it.
In
any case, the Movement itself rejected it.
When the Mississippi militants decided to go inside the conven–
tion, their strategy was no longer one of protest; it became political.
Outside the convention, the Movement would have been able
to
control what was said and done and could have put forth its total
program. But once the decision was made to organize as a
Democratic
party which would support the convention's candidate, if only to
get
a hearing the Movement had to ally with labor, liberal and reform
forces. Thus the basic question was: how far would the Movement
be able to move its meliorist allies.
.
From the outset then, the argument at Atlantic City was not
whether to compromise but what kind of compromise to accept. In
all reports of the convention, it's agreed that the MFDP was ready
to take something short of justice (justice would have meant accredit–
ing the MDFP as
the
Mississippi delegation and taking the privileges
of party membership, such as Congressional seniority, away from
aU
racist Democrats ) . The MFDP did feel, however, that the compromise
eventually settled upon (two at-large seats for the Freedom Party)
not only was inadequate, but also blocked the larger victory that
would have been won in a floor fight.
In the recrimination following the convention, a line of principle
was drawn between "us" (the Movement) and "them" (the white
liberals and the "former radicals" who advocated a qualified ac–
ceptance of the actual compromise). In doing this, you and the young
radicals mistook a bitter dispute over tactics for a question of funda–
mental perspective and morality.
Let me assume that the MFDP majority's analysis at Atlantic
City was completely correct. (I do not believe this to be the case.)
Even so,
if the MFDP wants to change the life of the Negro
in
Mississippi and of the black and white poor in the United States, it–
and the rest of the Movement- will have to collaborate with those
labor, liberal and church forces that favored the Atlantic City
compromise. Indeed, the support for the MFDP's challenge of the
seating and Congressional status of the Mississippi delegation has
come from those very labor, liberal and church forces. For nothing
