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and
political problem remains. Can the Communist status quo
be
ac–
cepted, without further ado? It is silly to think of a crusade to "roll back"
the "Iron Curtain." Is it not equally silly to give up all hope of seeing
an altered Eastern Europe? Doesn't that mean, in turn, that a Russian–
American understanding is, on many issues, out of the question? De
Gaulle's recalcitrance needs no other defense than to say that it does
not lessen the chances for change in Eastern Europe.
- When it comes to the lowest level of aspiration Fulbright is un–
exceptionable. He pleads for a sense of proportion in regard to Cuba;
he is willing to contemplate violent upheaval in Latin America without
much regret for the old friendly order; he refuses to treat the Communist
bloc as monolithic in ambition, or as malign, wholly other, in the
character of its leadership. Fulbright's intellectual courage shines forth
when he"takes up short-term practicalities as much as it does when he
speculates more freely. The trouble is that the tendency toward hysteria
and moral infantilism in dealing with the (European) Communist world
is not the problem in the foreseeable future. What is troubling is the
increasing American involvement in the life and politics of unstable
countries. There is no doubt that we could continue to involve ourselves
without
seri~us
risk of nuclear war. The Right Wing is correct in saying
that the United States does not do nearly all that it could safely get
away with; that it does not do all it can to pursue its
immediate
ad–
vantage; that it does not act like the strongest nation in the world. In
short, we still do not seek political greatness for its own sake. Fulbright
would say, thank heavens. But he does not say in public that, led by a
Democratic administration, we are drifting in that direction, and may
one day find the drift irreversible and decide to make a career out of
what began almost unconsciously. Johnson's record is amazing: Goulart
deposed, Tshombe restored and encouraged, Panama and Cambodia
bullied, North Vietnamese posts bombed, and God knows what is to
happen in Laos and South Vietnam. Would Goldwater have done more,
except work harder to unseat Castro? Certainly Fulbright's idealism
should confront this record as it does the conventional anti-Communist
rhetoric. There is, in fact, a radical discontinuity between Johnson's
policy and Fulbright's idealism. All that Fulbright can do
is
to acknow–
ledge that this is the case. But if he does not do at least that, he cannot
escape some responsibility for the delusion of the American people and the
half-aware Machiavellianism of its leaders.
George Kateb
