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GEORGE
KATE.
men of power can strive for? The second level of Fulbright's aspirations
is not precisely utopian, but still seems as far away from "new realities"
as the old myths Fulbright is out to discredit. He yearns for
'a
genuine
Atlantic political community; he also indicates a sneaking fondness for
a Russian-American management of the world. With such views, FuI·
bright would naturally regard de Gaulle as one of the worst culprits.
The French leader sees in the Atlantic political community a device for
prolonging American domination over Western Europe-the domination
is preponderantly benevolent, but domination it remains. He shares with
the Chinese an aversion-partly impure, partly ideological, partly neces–
sitous--to the reign of the industrial 'Superpowers. But in these views
Fulbright finds little except the spirit of obstruction, especially on the
matter of the Atlantic community. There is, however, more than spite,
more than injured pride and vain self-assertion. The heart of de Gaulle's
strategy is to qualify American purposes in the world while relying on
American protection. To keep Germany permanently divided, to en·
courage liberalism in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and
lessen their dependence on the Soviet Union, to intensify the Russian
definition of themselves as European and hence to strengthen the forces
of the West against the rage and hunger of the rest of the world-all
these things de Gaulle surely has in mind. Indeed, Fulbright ·is himself
friendly to such purposes. The difficulty is that a close Atlantic com·
munity, if it does work to keep Germany permanently divided, unfor·
tunately works against the rest of de Gaulle's plan. A cohesive Atlantic
community would most likely deepen the split between Eastern and
Western Europe-in any case, a reasonable man could think so. Doubt·
less this community would also make it easier for the United States and
the Soviet Union, each justifying its own control over its allies by the
control exercised by the other, to cooperate. But at what cost?
Fulbright is of course not alone in wanting Russian-American comity,
in wanting the Cold War to be swallowed up in a larger and vaguer enter·
prise. He is eloquent on the manner in which the contest with the
Russians has become a comfortable feature of American life: not merely
the vested interests, but our habits and reflexes are now adjusted to–
enmity toward the Soviet Union. Fifteen years of alarm and clamor
will
not be easy to efface. On the assumption that Khrushchev's successors
share with him his intent not to bury capitalism but to bury messianic
communism, there would seem to be no genuine conflict of interests
between the United States and the Soviet Union-except for one. I do
not refer to the German question, but to Eastern Europe. Despite the
cynicism of many people about the plight of Eastern Europe, a moral
