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a statement which few "historicists" would contest. The essential
dif–
ference between the method of the historical and that of the physical
sciences has been one of the major points in the philosophical discussion
since the nineteenth century, but one looks in vain for a discussion (or
even mentioning) of those theoretical efforts which were decisive for the
foundation, development, and critique of historicism: Droysen, Dilthey,
Simmel, Windelband, Rickert, Troeltsch-to mention only a few. These
are not merely additional names or references which mayor may not be
there; their analysis of conceptualization in the social and physical sci–
ences and of the "rationality" of history has direct bearing on Popper's
arguments. Failure to face their positions in full strength may account
for much of the thinness and abstractness of Popper's discussion.
But apart from this failure, Popper's argument against historical
predictability seems in itself inconclusive. To be sure, the growth of
human knowledge has "strongly influenced" the course of history. How–
ever, as such a factor, it has in turn been historically conditioned. It
seems that scientific knowledge has really influenced the course of his–
tory only as
accepted
knowledge, that is to say, if and when it corres–
ponded to the needs and capabilities of society. The latter are facts and
forces which operate in any given society as observable trends and
tendencies, and these provide the ground for historical predictability–
which is never more than projection of tendencies.
There are other theories which posit historical predictability and
more rigid and sweeping "laws" of historical development. They are
mostly cyclical theories, assuming a return of the pattern of the past.
Ultimately, they are derived from the idea of the basic unchangeability
of human nature, which asserts itself through all variations and inno–
vations. Thucydides and Macchiavelli, Vico, Spengler and Toynbee may
serve as examples. Their conception is fundamentally different from that
according to which the laws of historical development all but preclude
a return of the pattern of the past-so much so that they almost appear
as the laws of human freedom, circumscribing the conditions for the
exercise of human freedom, for the possibilities of change. Popper's pre–
sentation and critique obliterates the decisive difference between these
types of theories by submerging both in the constructed syndrome of
"historicism." We shall presently return to this point, after a further brief
examination of the syndrome.
III
Popper's abstract methodological discussion comes to life when it
reveals its concrete political implications. His most telling arguments
