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PARTISAN REVIEW
a methodological context in which the application of wholesale violence
is explained in terms of a specific philosophy of history and society.
Moreover, responsibility is assigned to the philosophy of historical law
and destiny (although perhaps not the entire responsibility) , which in–
cludes, undifferentiated by Popper, the fascist ideology and the com–
munist theory. And the same philosophy is held to
be
logically faulty,
unscientific, and in this sense irrational. I wish to raise the question
whether the philosophical context in which historical violence is dis–
cussed does not develop the problem on a level of misplaced abstract–
ness, thus diverting attention from the real factors of violence, from
its societal function, and from the historical means of combating it.
Now it is certainly true that a philosophy of history has frequently
been used to justify the liquidation of countless individuals who, by
their faith or origin, by their position in society, by their opinions and
actions, were considered as standing in the way of historical destiny.
Examples may be adduced from Robespierre's Republic of Virtue to
the Stalinist terror. One might not stress unduly the concept of historical
destiny if one goes further back and adds practically all crusades, in–
quisitions, religious wars-even those declared in the name of toleration
and religious freedom. It is also true that Marxian theory contains the
notion of inexorable laws of society-although here it is precisely the
abolition
of these
oppressive
laws which is the aim and the rationale
of the socialist revolution. It is much less certain whether the fascist
ideology has the idea of inexorable laws of history-rather the denial
of history, acting against history, regression to "nature" are charac–
teristic of fascism. But this is largely irrelevant to the question whether,
in all these cases, belief in historical destiny really explains terror. I
propose that it does not: where it was prevalent, it was derivative from
and conditional upon other factors in such a sense that a discussion
which neglects these factors abstracts from the essential and suggests
an incorrect interpretation of the causes, the function, and the prospects
of historical violence.
If
these factors are present (I shall presently try
to indicate them), there
is
no philosophy of history which may not
lend itself to the systematic use of violence. As the history of liberalism
from the seventeenth to the present century shows, the gradualist and
pluralist approach is no exception-be it only because of its incapacity
to prevent violence and by its readiness (with good conscience) to meet
violence with violence.
I admit that this last point can be conceded only if the indictment
of mass extermination is not from the beginning restricted and made
to conform with the standards and criteria of the society from whose
