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looked them. As Pareto pointed out, one of the principal ways in which
sham proofs enter into the argument for natural right is the definition
of one unknown by another. Strauss unwittingly provides some choice
illustrations of Pareto's observation. E.g., he defines the "common good"
by the "understanding of the whole" or by the "hierarchic order of
man's natural constitution," and these again he defines by the "natural
order of the wants," which in turn is defined by the "perfection of
man's nature," the "natural inclinations," etc., etc. Sensing that there
is something wrong here and that such formulae are not entirely unam–
biguous, Strauss admits they need an interpretation by the most "un–
biased and competent, i.e., not morally obtuse men," maintaining that
"the best regime is the object of the wish or prayer of all good men."
But these expressions are as empty as the others, because any judgment
of the moral qualities of a man already presupposes the ethical standards
in
question. Another variety of the same device, used by the author,
is the shift of the problem from one level to another and leaving it
there unanswered. Finally Strauss concedes that there are no uni–
versally valid rules of action, only a "universally valid hierarchy of
ends." What these ends are remains as mysterious at the end of the
chapter as at the beginning.
More satisfactory are the two chapters that follow on the decompo–
sition of the classic doctrine of natural right from Hobbes to Burke.
But even as an historical account the book is left far behind by the
most recent German publication,
Naturrecht und materiale Gerech–
tigkeit
by Hans Welzel, who is well aware of the circular reasonings
and empty or question-begging formulae so widespread in traditional
legal and moral doctrine.
The most important and revealing question to ask of any book
claiming to give a valid idea of natural right relates to its practical
outlook. Now, in asking such a question, we usually find that in most
cases the alleged principles of absolute justice are easily identifiable as
the ideals, aims and interests of a certain social group or political move–
ment, e.g., liberalism, fascism, communism. But sometimes the political
conclusions are less palpable. That is the case here. On the first page
Strauss pays lip-service to the Constitution and the right of man to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; but very soon he declares
that this kind of natural right gave rise to what he calls liberal rela–
tivism and modern nihilism. Obviously he prefers another type of na–
tural right, the practical consequences of which cannot be easily defined.
Strauss gives only one piece of practical advice: the true statesman in
the Aristotelian sense should take his bearings by the normal situation
and by what is normally right and that he should only reluctantly de-
