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attempt to overcome the distinction between fact and value so as to save
the idea of natural right. Thus he does not even
mention
the numerous
and often very penetrating refutations of that idea by Kantian and
positivistic philosophers. Instead he attacks Max Weber, who never
explicitly criticized the traditions of natural law. Hence all that Strauss
can show is that Weber was rather inconsistent in the use of his own
principle of
Wertfreiheit
(value-neutrality). In asserting that every so–
ciology necessarily implies some evaluations Strauss is right, to be sure,
but only insofar as our everyday language is deeply imbued with evalu–
ative connotations and therefore it is sometimes very difficult to find
neutral expressions. But to grant that it is not always possible to draw
clear boundaries in our historical and sociological knowledge is very
far from proving that there is no decisive difference between fact and
value and that absolute values actually
exist.
Strauss becomes wholly the victim of logical fallacies and dog–
matic presuppositions when he expounds the principles of the Platonic
and Aristoteli,an doctrine of natural right. He believes that these
prin–
ciples are still valid and that they have been blurred by modern
heresies. The emergence of the idea of natural law, he remarks
quite
correctly, is deeply connected with the strains and insecurities of social
change. Only when the established order is shaken does the need arise
for an
authority
capable of deciding between two or more conflicting
views about the essence of the just or the best society. But can human
cognition constitute itself as such an authority? The answer is no–
in spite of the most sincere efforts on the part of many outstanding
philosophers during more than two millennia. Since the later decades
of the nineteenth century it has been shown by thinkers like Henry
Sidgwick, Vilfredo Pareto, Hans Kelsen and others, that the alleged
principles of natural right or, what is the same, absolute justice are mere
tautologies and other empty formulae, which can be employed to
"justify" any existing or desired legal and moral order. Moreover, their
emptiness makes them idea:lly suitable for use as a mask for the most
resolute power-politics, though they may also hide profound uncer–
tainty
and uneasiness concerning moral standards and political action.
Strauss is too intelligent and sensitive not at least to feel these
difficulties. He is apparently unwilling, however, to face them squarely
or to bring them to the full awareness of the reader, since to do so
would lead to the collapse of his entire system. His chapter on classic
natural right thus turns into one of the most comprehensive collections
of the diverse fallacies to which this type of discourse is open. The
fallacies are frequently so clearly formulated and lie so near to the
surface that
it
is hard to understand how the author could have over-
