THE ORIGINAL SIN OF THE INTELLECT
45
thing contrary to its wishes without endangering himself; expulsion
means contempt and heightened danger.
If
the Party controls his
job, expulsion will cost him the material basis of his existence;
nothing remains for
him
but to go to the uranium mines in Aue,
assuming that he can still control his own destiny to that extent.
(fDas erste steht uns frei, beim zweiten sind wir Knecht e."
Or, more
simply, who says A must also say B. For anyone who cannot submit
and deny himself totally, it is especially dangerous to be given a
Party function, the more so the deeper his insight into the system
and its hidden mechanism. The system will try to bind him to his
crimes as securely as possible; if he resists, it will be made clear to
him
that his association is public knowledge, that every retreat is
closed, the way to freedom cut off. " In the West they will prosecute
you anyway," that is the final lesson in Party morals for the func–
tionaries. The Party can forgive everything except treason, and
flight to the West is treason.
The West does its part when it threatens retribution. It strength–
ens the Soviet regime, and the Central Committee is happy to find
support from these unexpected quarters.
As
long as membership or
activity as a functionary in the SED makes a refugee from the East
morally suspect, or serves as a reason for denying him recognition
as a political refugee, the West strengthens the SED regime. Waver–
ing functionaries and members then discover a personal interest in
maintaining and securing the regime, and they evince a correspond–
ingly greater degree of solidarity with it. Of course, one should not
demand that they flee. But they should know that in case of danger
they can receive equal rights in the West if they have not committed
any crimes. Then many would act with less rigor and fanaticism, to
the advantage of the population; and many in the Party, state, or
secret police would not hesitate to engage in a kind of passive
resistance.
Nevertheless, the Soviet system, the Communist Parties, and
the SED are not ruled and held together by power and fear alone.
Even the alleged confirmation of theory through political practice,
the territorial and numerical expansion since the war, in short, the
argument from success, repeated ad nauseam to build confidence,
is insufficient to explain the sway of the Communist Parties. The
feeling of participation in power, the material advantages enjoyed
