264
PARTISAN REVIEW
tion; why, then, make one set of assumptions rather than another?
Russell's answer was not very clear. The possibility that "reasonable–
ness" in making ultimate assumptions could be explained in terms of
the exactions imposed by the world on any behavior seeking appro–
priate means to achieve ends was not fully explored in the discussion.
Many of Russell's auditors got the impression, which he subsequently
denied, that he was defending a wholesale skepticism, and that
be–
neath his brilliant paradoxes he was really fortifying the view that all
basic assumptions, not only about the structure of values but also
about the structure of facts, were equally valid.
If
one were stubborn
enough, one could believe anything. It was quite clear, however, that
without subscribing to any other historically familiar philosophical
position, Russell was indicating what he believed were the limits of
empiricism. Science is developed in the course of experience, but in
order to justify the inferences which science makes we are thrown
back upon certain principles or postulates concerning the structure of
the world that cannot be logically deduced from the facts of experi–
ence. Therefore,
if
science is a valid body of knowledge, we must
know something independently of experience.
The most exciting of the plenary sessions was the one devoted
to the nature of the good society. Professor Rieger of Charles Uni–
versity, Prague, presented a defense, in the guise of a philosophy of
collective work, of the "new socialist humanism and democracy" in
Eastern Europe. Professor Karl Popper of the University of London
delivered a penetrating critique of the Communist version of Marxism.
The battle was joined in a sharp discussion despite Professor Pos's
efforts to blanket it. Professor Popper defined the task of social science
as the prediction of the unintended consequences of our intended
action. Denying the existence of historical laws, he claimed that Com–
munist predictions were prophecies that had more in common with
theology than science. "It is the task of public policy," he declared,
"not to increase happiness but to fight against misery," on the inter–
esting ground that it was easier to discover what made men unhappy
than what made them happy. He argued that the desire to make
people happy by decree could easily lead to dictatorship. This position
received support from Professor Julius Ebbinghaus of Marburg, son
of the famous German psychologist and one of the few carefully
screened German philosophers who were invited. (Philosophers of
