THE DOUBLE
CRISIS
Communist problem: the illusion, that is to say, that it is not neces–
sary to face the Communist problem, which will spontaneously
"wither away" as prosperity is restored. The liberals should re-read
the speech which Andrey Zhdanov, as representative of the Soviet
Politbureau, delivered at the founding conference of the Cominform.
They refuse to comprehend that the Communists have decided not
to permit economic restoration in western Europe, and that the
present Communist strength in France, Italy, Germany, and Greece
is sufficient to enforce the decision. It follows that European recov–
ery is impossible unless the Communists in western Europe are re–
duced to impotence. Not all the billions of a dozen Marshall Plans
nor an encyclopedia of Third Force speeches and manifestoes can
wish away this awkward syllogism.
Malraux:
Objectively, there was no need in 1944 for Stalin
to launch his party into a campaign against the reconstruction of
France. Today, however, a reconstructed France could not fail to
be attracted into the orbit of the Anglo-Saxon countries, in partic–
ular the United States. It is thus now indispensable for the Rus–
sians to prevent the reconstruction of France; and the enforcement
of her decay can have only two consequences. Either her continuing
weakness will put the country, so to speak, in a neutral position,
partly occupied (by the Stalinists) ; or there will be a deep depres–
sion in which Communism can root itself. It is in this
objective
con–
flict between Soviet Russia and France that the historian will see
the decisive element in the victory of Gaullism.
What do the Russians think they have to do? First, gain time
until an American depression. They expect it in 1949. They assume
that it may be delayed. While they are waiting, they want to neutral–
ize the Marshall Plan and everything which might serve the same
purpose. The strikes in November cost France more than a month's
Marshall Plan assistance. The aim is to exasperate the American
people, and to give them the idea that their dollars will be wasted.
That is why I think that the question whether American aid will
have the desired results is entirely dependent on the effectiveness with
which the problem of Communist interference in western Europe is
handled.
Burnham:
It is not, however, surprising, even after a genera-
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