Vol. 8 No. 5 1941 - page 441

BOOKS
437
the only commentator who attributes the unexpected character of the war
to the fact that the dictators understood the new offensive possibilities of
armored equipment while the democracies were belatedly preparing for
a 1914 war of position; but he analyzes the progressive situations with a
clarity I have not seen heretofore, and his appraisals are brilliantly docu·
mented by contrasting observations of Nazi military tacticians with the
pitiful assertions of Gamelin, Renaud, etc. Werner is the only intelligent
writer, however, (the book appeared last spring, before the German
assault on Russia) who reiterates that the Soviet Union alone since the
rise of Nazism has possessed an army which could face Germany on any·
thing like equal terms; and that in many branches of equipment the
U.S.S.R. outclassed Germany completely.
The statistical comparisons of German, Russian and Allied armed
forces are presented with great vividness. Werner attributes the rapid
French disintegration to the Nazi understanding of the "war of movement"
coupled with immeasurably superior "fire-power." Although taking into
account the demoralizing effects of the Sitzkrieg, he soft-pedals the tales
of French treachery and cowardice usually played up by the journalistic
analysts.
The Soviet debacle in Finland is correctly ascribed to the fact that it
was conducted purely as a local undertaking with little preparation, in
which only troops of the Leningrad district were employed; and that in
the final assault on the Mann.erheim Line the Soviets proved that they also
understood the new offensive techniques. Again the author unearths reveal·
ing statements, this time some of the bright suggestions of Allied military
advisers for sending vast expeditions against the U.S.S.R. via Finland and
the Caucasus-whereas the British and French had only a fraction of the
requisite man-power and equipment to protect their own home soil. The
refusal of Sweden to allow Allied troops passage across its territory to
aid the Finns is appraised as about the only bit of good luck that came
the Allies' way before Dunkirk.
The last three chapters are less concerned with military affairs and
are far less interesting. In the section entitled
The Foreign Palicy of the
Soviet Union
Stalin is depicted as concerned only with Russia's particular
interests. Whether the Hitler pact and subsequent aggressions were bene·
ficial to these particular interests might be further discussed in the light
of recent developments. The last chapter,
The Decisions Facing America
reads like a Roosevelt fire-side chat-particularly the one beginning
"From the Cape Verde Islands to Pernambuco is 1609 miles.'' The state·
ments quoted throughout this section are from Walter Lippmann, Hanson
Baldwin, and others, which seem like an awful anti-climax, even after
Renaud and Gamelin.
GEORGE L. K. MoRRIS
352...,431,432,433,434,435,436,437,438,439,440 442,443,444,445,446
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