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win to his variations. Given these random mutations, the Darwinian proc·
ess may begin to operate. Rather than examine the evidence presented by
contemporary biologists, Mr. Barzun is content to rest upon the work of
Bateson alone, impervious to the whole literature which has grown up as
a result of discussion of his work. Mr. Barzun refers to a hook by one, I
think, contemporary biologist, who points out that the causes of muta·
tions are not known. But it is interesting that Mr. Barzun neglects to say
that work is being carried out in an attempt to solve just this problem–
for instance the work of H.
J.
Muller upon the connection between X-rays
and the mutation process. The only inference that can he drawn is that
Mr. Barzun has been blinded by his dislike for Darwin into an unscien·
tific neglect of evidence, which, no matter how much one is opposed to
"scientism," is a serious omission, particularly when one is discussing a
scientific question.
The failure to consider scientific questions in a scientific way is
repeated by Mr. Barzun in his metaphysical, methodological, and ethical
discussions of suhje<:ts which come under the heading of economics. The
most flagrant examples occur in the discussion of Marx on value. Consider
the following statement: "Marx's notion of value is thus at bottom identi·
cal with the Matter of the physicist-an absolute, homogeneous, measur·
able abstraction, which is imagined as lying beneath the surface qualities
of things" (p. 150). Now surely this is a totally irrelevant comment.
What does the word "absolute'' denote? Why the reference to Matter
altogether? Apart from all questions of the truth of the theory of value,
is there anything
logically
incorrect in saying that two commodities which
exchange for each other have the same exchange-value? Why isn't it
possible to define a function,
equality of exchange-value,
in this way? And
what is methodologically unsound about trying to show that the exchange·
value of commodities will he equal if the amount of socially necessary
labor-time put into them are also equal? The only relevant objection to
this would he that it is false, and no amount of methodological nonsense
can service as a substitute for patient empirical analysis if one wishes to
prove that it is false. Mr. Barzun's objection is completely irrelevant; it
is too easy a way out.
The same type of comment on value appears when he summarizes
the difference between the classical and marginal utility theories of value.
He says: "The classical and Marxian views were that value arose from
labor embodied in things. The new view asserted that value arose from
human awareness of comparative usefulness in a world where goods are
scarce. Value was a psychological as well as an objective fact" (p. 219).
It is hard to gather anything from Mr. Barzun's hook which will clarify
this last statement. And when we read a little further on that "The sig·
nificance of utility, banished by Marx in favor of labor, was ... rea£.
firmed" by the marginalists, and also that these marginalists showed that
"Things have value because we want them," we are completely at a loss.
For now it appears as though Marx and Ricardo had never distinguished
