66
PARTISAN REVIEW
munist as one who accepts the principles and tactics of the Third lnte.r·
national. For, he has said, "to define Communism in terms of membership
in a specific organization is as inadequate as to define Christianity in terms
of membership in any particular church."
(Mea~ng
of
~arx,
p. ,101:)
This appeared originally in 1934. Let us compare It now
w~th
Hooks
d1~·
cussion of Dewey on Marxism in the latest book. In extenuation of Dewey.s
failure to study the works of Marx and Engels very carefully and h1s
tendency to examine only their political disciples, Ho.ok
s~ys: "M~rx~sm
for Dewey was what those who called themselves Marxists made of 1t; JUSt
as Marxists would say that Christianity is what those who call themselves
Christians live by."
(John Dewey,
p. 162.) Presumably the type of defini–
tion that was inadequate in 1934 has become legitimate (on Marxian
grounds!) in 1939.
But Hook's defense, which he makes at the pain of contradicting
other things he has said, goes unheeded by Dewey in
Freedom and Culture.
Here, Dewey's attack is not along empirical lines, but on the contrary,
raises almost every charge Hook has occupied himself with refuting. They
are:
{1)
Marxism was derived from Hegel's metaphysics.
This charge dif–
fers in no way from Bertrand Russell's ungrounded attack on Dewey
because of Dewey's own debt to Hegel. Dewey justifiably attacks Russell's
distortion, and for this reason it is astonishing that he should use the same
type of argument against Marx. (2)
Marxism "was not derived nor sup–
posed to be derived from study of historical events."
This is equally
astonishing. As for Marx's generalizations not being derived from study
of historical events, what significance does Dewey attach to the three vol–
umes of
Capital,
and the historical treatments of the revolutions in France
and Germany? And how can Dewey say that they were not
supposed
to be
derived from a study of historical events in the light of Marx's completely
empirical avowals in the
German Ideology
and throughout
Capital?
{3)
The generalizations of Marx are assigned "absolute necessity" and cer–
tainty.
This comment, of course, upsets Prof. Hook's placid picture of
Dewey's criticism of Marx as simply based on a different estimate of the
weight of evidence, and not on an unfair attribution of a belief in a priori
necessity. (4)
Marx denied moving power to human valuations.
Here we
need only cite Hook's thesis that Marxism is both practical and normative;
that
it
makes statements in economics, and value-judgments, and that it
does not
deduce
the latter from the former.
If
to be a Marxist is to accept the tactics and principles that Hook
credits Marx with, then surely Dewey is not a Marxist. And yet Hook main–
tains that Dewey and Marxists can take part in common political activities.
But
if
Dewey, operating without the
theories
of Marx and Hook, is able
to come to the same political activity, what special control over affairs do
any of Marx's principles effect? What determines Hook's acceptance of
them if Dewey is able to engage in the same political activity without their
instrumental aid?
The discussion has been limited to the more immediate problems
in
