WHAT IS
LOG~CAL
EMPIRICISM?
73
only two kinds of cognitive meanings: formal and empirical. Many
philosophers, however, hold that there is a third kind, namely, meta–
physical. These statements purport to make assertions concerning
matters which transcend the empirical but which, nevertheless, are in
some sense "real." The following sentences are typical of this class:
1) "The ultimate nature of reality is mental." 2) "Matter is real."
3) "Things are complexes of sensations." 4) "All events are predeter–
mined." Each of these statements has been regarded as true in one or
another of traditional metaphysical systems. Despite the apparently
empirical content of these doctrines, logical analysis shows them to
be devoid of literal assertions concerning any empirical subject mat–
ter. The third and fourth sentences tum out to be syntactical state–
ments in metaphorical (pseudo-empirical) form. The first and second
sentences are shown to be fictive statements without any metaphorical
function. Like bad literary fictions, they may be cogent enough in
their own world of fancy, but they have no content cognitive of the
natural world.
Theories of Science and Criticism
In the present phase of its development logical empiricism has
two aspects, which for the sake of clarity need to be distinguished.
On the one hand it is a
theory
in the logic of science; on the other
hand it is a
program
for philosophical inquiry. In its first aspect it
forms assertions subject to verification by the examination of the
language of science and by the observations of the operations of sci–
entific inquiry. In its second aspect, it formulates not
assertions,
but
resolutions
or
directives
whereby it proposes to adopt certain rules
and limitations for philosophical inquiry. In this latter function it is
not subject to verification of any kind. It is, however, open to justifi–
cation by showing that certain desirable consequences result from the
acceptance of the proposed limitations.
So far we have dealt only with the assertive or theoretical phases
of logical empiricism. The justification of its resolutive aspects are
based on these theoretical conclusions. The analysis of science has
disclosed certain criteria of empirical languages by means of which
all statements can be clearly distinguished as empirical or non-empir–
ical. The analysis of mathematics has furnished additional criteria for
separating non-empirical sentences into
logical~mathematical
(both
literal and metaphorical) , and purely fictive (or cognitively mean–
ingless) statements. On the basis of this analysis, logical empiricism
proposes that philosophical statements be limited to the logical-mathe–
matical type. In other words, it resolves to identify philosophy with
logical analysis.
