WHAT lS LOGICAL EMPIRICISM?
65
ophy of the French Encyclopedists. A similar union of logical form·
alism and scientific empiricism forms the leading principle of the new
Encyclopedia. Like the doctrine of "universal reason" the philosophy
of
unified science
has special bearing on social problems. It widens the
domain of scientific method to embrace all intellectual and practical
enterprise. And in its anti·metaphysical methodology it constitutes a
challenge not merely to traditional, speculative philosophy, but to
every form of transcendentalism in the social sciences.
Materialistic conceptions of social phenomena are usually no
more free of metaphysical doctrines than theories which regard S9Cial
phenomena as manifestations of transcendent, spiritual values. Doc–
trines concerning the material and spiritual nature of "reality", or the
"ultimate basis" and necessity of social phenomena obscure the prac·
tical issues between diverse philosophies of society. Dialectical materi·
alism is no exception, and the persistent linkage of its metaphysical
dogmas with Marxist social theory is particularly objectionable in
view of the demand-generally made by Marxists-that theory be per–
tinent to, and continuous with, practice. The latter requirement
~,s
irreconcilable with metaphysics. Indeed, it is on the systematic
elaboration of this criterion that logical empiricists base their critique
of metaphysical doctrines.
This attack on metaphysics is not itself metaphysical. Its weapons
were forged in recent analytic studies of logic and the methodology
of empirical sciences. Attempts to refute logical empiricism by inter·
preting it as a new metaphysics have generally confused it with the
IICilSationalistic positivism of the nineteenth century. Curiously enough
some of these attempts have been made by writers who profess to be
Marxists, but who evidently take their metaphysics more seriously
than empirical social analysis. Against such inversion of values in social
theory, logical positivism offers an effective critical instrument in the
fonn of an anti-metaphysical, scientific philosophy.
The project of making philosophy scientific is not new. Many
philosophers in the past have proposed such reforms. Descartes'
Discourse on Method,
Leibnitz's program for a universal scientific
and philosophical language, and Hume's
Treatise on Human Nature
-which he described as "an attempt to introduce the experimental
method in moral subjects"-were all motivated by a desire to in·
troduce scientific ,method into philosophical analysis. These earlier
ideals
of scientific philosophy differed from the contemporary one
in
their conception of scientific knowledge. In other words, they
differed in what they regarded as adequate evidence for knowledge.
Such theories of evidence have been perhaps the most important
distinguishing features of philosophical systems, and through their
