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CAS prof sees shift in U.S. war policy
By David J. Craig
When President George W. Bush announced in early September his intention
to invade Iraq, many critics complained that he offered few details about
his rationale or objective. Gradually, some members of Congress began
asking the same questions foreign leaders already had leveled at Bush:
what is happening in Iraq that suddenly necessitates an attack? Wouldn't
an invasion distract the government from its broader war on terrorism?
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Bruce Schulman Photo by Kalman Zabarsky |
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Responding to the demand for details, the Bush administration began working
with Congress and the United Nations. It was a wise decision, both for
Bush and for the country, according to Bruce Schulman, a CAS history professor
and an expert on U.S. history in the second half of the 20th century.
During the past 50 years, Schulman says, U.S. presidents have tended to
jump into armed conflicts without thoroughly laying out their case to
the American public and allowing time for substantial debate. "It's
been a fairly consistent trend," he says, "and it hasn't worked
out very well, certainly not in the medium to long term, even if it might
serve the president's purposes in the short term."
An overwhelming majority of Americans currently back a war with Iraq.
However, that support is "broad, but shallow," Schulman says,
meaning public opinion could shift when more details about the situation
come to light or if a military operation does not prove a quick success.
"I don't think the support for the war is very passionate, or based
on deep understanding," he says. "There seems to be more of
a sense of simply giving Bush the benefit of the doubt."
Let's talk about it
Removing Saddam Hussein from power is expected to involve a more drawn-out
military operation than the first-round knockout that was 1991's six-week
Gulf War, and conflicts with sustained public support in the United States
historically have been pitched to citizens very carefully. Writing in
a September 15 New York Times piece, Schulman describes how before the
United States entered World War I and World War II, Presidents Woodrow
Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt built a broad national consensus by encouraging
lengthy public debate. In the late 1930s, for instance, Roosevelt undertook
a nearly four-year "national conversation" to build support
for the coming war, Schulman writes.
But during the Cold War, as the danger of a nuclear attack seemed ever
imminent and world crises developed more quickly, he says, the power to
make foreign policy decisions became concentrated in the White House as
never before. "With no debate or even warning, chief executives repeatedly
ordered military action," he writes. "Many small-scale conflicts
-- for example, Lyndon B. Johnson's intervention in the Dominican Republic
and Ronald Reagan's invasion of Grenada -- proved military and political
successes. Others quickly soured, like the C.I.A.-backed Bay of Pigs operation
ordered by John F. Kennedy."
Perhaps no American foreign affairs blunder compares to Johnson's handling
of Vietnam, however, where after getting carte blanche from Congress to
use military force, he escalated the conflict in secret. "He never
explained his actions to the nation or sought its approval," Schulman
writes. "He misled both Congress and the public about the gravity
of his actions," and in doing so, "damaged his own and the nation's
credibility."
Let him decide
So how has Bush done so far? "A month ago, I would have given him
an F," says Schulman. "The administration's stance was that
it had all the authority it needed to strike Iraq and that no debate was
necessary. I'd say his grade is in the B-range now, because he's taken
his case to the United Nations, he's made several speeches before the
country, and both the vice president and the secretary of defense have
met with congressional leaders."
But expect congressional debates about Iraq to stick to specific strategic
points regarding an attack, Schulman says, and avoid fundamental ideological
issues, such as how a war could affect anti-Americanism around the world.
After all, he says, the Democratic Party has become steadily more hawkish
during the last 10 years, in part because it is seen as politically unwise
for a member of Congress to publicly oppose military action if the president
decides it's necessary. And then, of course, the wave of patriotism in
the United States following the World Trade Center attacks makes public
opposition less likely.
"I certainly think this endeavor is bigger and riskier than we're
being led to believe, and there are some serious questions that deserve
to be asked about what the goals of this war are," he says. "But
I think that whenever Congress votes on its resolution to authorize the
president to use force, it will be a near-unanimous vote.
"This is another situation where the historical record sends up some
real danger signals," he continues. "Since the end of World
War II, Congress has consistently shied away from taking any substantive
responsibility in times of war. Members of Congress don't want the president
to go to war without them, but they want him to retain full accountability
for what happens. That's why you see this tendency for them to issue more
or less carte blanche resolutions."
4 October 2002
Boston University
Office of University Relations