Kuona is a Shona (one of Zimbabwe's major languages) verb meaning to see. In poetic
constructions it is often used as an ocular metaphor meaning insight or understanding.
This ocular metaphor, it seems to me, can be used to describe Mugambi's assessment of the
exclusivistic claims one often encounters in the Abrahamic religions. "Only those who
believe as we do have any hope of an eternity with God." "We are the ones
destined or predestined for heaven." These and such claims often arise from a
strongly held belief that the adherent is one of God's chosen ones. Part of Mugambi's
project has been to make an assessment of this notion of chosenness in the Abrahamic
religions. He does so particularly with reference to the relationship between Christianity
and the African religious heritage. Mugambi's literary output includes several pieces that
deserve a wider circulation. Among some of his main pieces are African Heritage and
Contemporary Christianity (1989), African Christian Theology (1989) and his most recent
From Liberation to Reconstruction: African Christian Theology After the Cold War
(1995). In this paper I would like to focus on Mugambi's African perspective on
those religions that embrace the notion of chosenness. His appraisal of the doctrine of
election common to the three Abrahamic religions Christianity, Judaism, and Islam is
particularly worth examining. Since his reflections proceed from a decidedly Christian
self-understanding, I also seek to relate Mugambi's perspective with some assessments that
are emerging from scholars who are associated with one of the other Abrahamic religions,
Judaism. In my study of Mugambi's published works, I assessed Mugambi's philosophical
theology as having strong affinities with Hickian pluralism.
John Hick has led a campaign to persuade Christians of Europe and North America to be
more appreciative of other religious traditions. Hick argues that Christians ought to
affirm that salvation is accessible through religious traditions other than Christianity.
Although Christians can faithfully affirm Jesus Christ as the way to eternal salvation,
such affirmation must not be in exclusivistic terms. Since "God is greater than all
our theologies," in Hick's view, Christians have to reckon with "the big fact
that the salvific process of the creating of human animals into children of God is not
confined to the Christian section of mankind." Mugambi deems the Hickian
"open-minded approach to religious traditions other than his own . . . " the
best in dealing with the issue of human destiny. Such an approach, he feels, enhances more
effective dialogue, which is especially useful in a religiously pluralistic world.
Even though Mugambi empathizes with Hick, he is careful though to point out that Hick's
campaign is particularly for the benefit of Oriental religious traditions. He has not been
aware of any specific effort by Hick to promote an appreciation of the African religious
heritage. In a way Mugambi's writings are an effort to promote this heritage. When Mugambi
makes reference to Hick in his works, his intention is to indicate that within the
Anglo-Saxon heritage there are scholars who are aware of the short-comings of Eurocentric
philosophies of religion and missiologies. Hick's pluralism argues for the coherence of
five proposals. They may be summarized as follows:
- God (the Real, the Ultimate, the Noumenal) is the center of the religious world.
- Any view that makes Christ or Christianity the center and the test of religious truth is
erroneous.
- Non-Christian religions are, in fact, theocentric. They have their center in the One
reality which is common to them all.
- The truth of these religions is judged not by their distance from Christ, but from God.
- Christianity is only one of the many religions and the test of its truth is no different
than the test of truth for others. Does it manifest the noumenal and is it effective in
morally changing lives? Mugambi's view is neither that all religions are of equal
validity, nor that one religion is as "good" as any other. He contends that no
one is entitled to such a verdict. The possibility of such kinds of judgments is dependent
on the existence of a set of objective criteria by which to evaluate all religions.
Mugambi argues that humans are interested parties in all matters concerning religion.
Wisdom then would dictate that such judgments be avoided or withheld in accordance with
the principles of natural justice.
Mugambi understands the first principle of natural justice to hold: That every party
deserves a fair hearing before judgment is delivered on a case affecting such a party in
any way. He is persuaded that non-Caucasian cultures have not had a fair hearing
throughout the history of Christianity since Constantine. He deplores the situation in
which Christians of these cultures have been expected always to do the listening, while
the theological interpretations are forged out in Rome, Geneva, Wittenberg, Canterbury,
Edinburgh, Dallas, Nashville, and so on.
The second principle of natural justice that Mugambi deems pertinent to a fair
philosophy of religion is: That no one should participate as a judge in a case of which
one is an interested party. In light of this principle only God has such a prerogative
because God is, according to Mugambi, just by definition. Christians, however, have had
the audacious tendency to act as judges in their own cases, expecting everyone else to
accept their verdict. Since Mugambi enjoins Christians and other adherents of various
religions to withhold judgments about competing truth claims, the question that he has to
answer is that of the relationship between the various religious heritages.
Mugambi's view is that each religious community is entitled to explain to others what
it understands religion to be. Each community should also articulate the impact of
religious experience on the lives of its members, their history, and their environment.
Those who listen may be moved to respond positively, negatively, or even apathetically.
One truth claim made not only by Christianity, but also by the other Mosaic religions,
Judaism and Islam, that elicits Mugambi's unfavorable assessment is that of election. The
closely related doctrine of the remnant is likewise found suspect. These doctrines, in
Mugambi's view, do not seem at all consistent with the notion of a benevolent deity. They
may make their proponents feel "good" by virtue of being the chosen ones, the
Remnant, the Elect. But what if one discovers that one is out of the fold? Such doctrines
are bound to bring upon one a terrible case of the upsets, especially if one finds oneself
out of the fold through no fault of ones own. One should appreciate that all who desire to
see (kuona) clearly whether one religion has a better account than another are always
doing so through lenses colored by their own religion. Kuona also occurs within the
limited space marked out by one's own religious particular context. Such limitation
mandates an epistemological humility on the part of those who might be tempted to be too
self-assured about being a special chosen group by God.
Mugambi charges the Mosaic religions — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam —
with a grievous shortcoming whenever they affirm the doctrines of the election and the
remnant. Inasmuch as these doctrines credit God with the prerogative to choose, it seems
commonsensical for any group to consider the very live possibility that they themselves
may not be the chosen ones. In Mugambi's estimate, the doctrine of grace should be
considered as a counterpoise to the doctrines of election and remnant. Such considerations
lead him to the conclusion that "God could choose anyone else other than the Hebrews,
Christians, and the Muslims as a means to achieve divine objectives in history."
Mugambi's acute discomfort with election is shared by many others.
Mugambi's negative assessment of the doctrine of election and the notion that any one
group is God's chosen people is one that some adherents of Judaism have come to endorse
independently. Chaim Potok's novel The Chosen is a fascinating study in-part about how the
more conservative adherents to Judaism want to maintain the belief that the Jews are THE
chosen people. I mention this novel in passing to commend it for your enjoyment.
Discomfort with the key concept of chosenness has been expressed in critical pieces by
some who identify themselves with Judaism. The feminist perspective of Judith Plaskow and
the post-Auschwitz reflections of Richard Rubenstein are worth our examination. In her
piece "Transforming the Nature of Community: Toward a Feminist People of
Israel,"Plaskow explores the far-reaching changes in Jewish self-understanding. She
argues for a rewriting of Jewish history to include the history of women. In such a
process she observes, however, "One cannot hope to create a feminist Jewish people .
. . without also considering certain theological questions — the significance and
spiritual dimensions of community, the conceptualization of difference in Jewish life, and
the key concept of chosenness."
Plaskow judges the notion of chosenness as the chief expression of repugnant
hierarchical distinctions. She sees in the notion a close association with claims to
superiority. Positively viewed chosenness has been a source of sustenance and survival for
Jews. Negatively though, as Reconstructionists are wont to point out, the notion affirms a
hierarchical difference that entails privilege and superiority. Plaskow rejects chosenness
on two grounds. With most other reinterpretations of election she sees the notion as passe
in a world were Jews have to relate to the wider society. It would be most difficult to
reconcile chosenness with equality and participation in a pluralistic world. A related
reason for rejecting chosenness is the desirability to rid society of hierarchical
dualisms. Mugambi would concur. It is dualisms that are partly responsible for Africa's
treatment as inconsequential. Recognition that Africa has much to offer mandates a renewal
of efforts to appropriate the positive elements of its multifarious religious heritage.
Rubenstein, in "Person and Myth in the Judeo-Christian Encounter," subjects
the notion of chosenness to an even more scathing rejection. He declares: "After the
experience of our times, we can neither affirm the myth of the omnipotent God of History
nor can we maintain its corollary, the election of Israel." Why such an unapologetic
rejection of chosenness? Part of Rubenstein's rejection is on the grounds that the notion
destroys the Jews' most precious attribute, their simple humanity. He argues that because
of this myth of chosenness all kinds of pernicious acts have been perpetrated against the
Jew. If, as Rubenstein proposes, the process of demythologization touches even this most
precious of Judaeo-Christian beliefs, then Jews are no longer condemned to dwell in the
domain of the sacred, a dwelling that has frequently destined them to die as sacrificial
offerings. Jews can thus engage the other peoples of this pluralistic world in true
dialogue. Mugambi shares a similar assessment. His call for the African voice to be heard
in universal deliberations moves beyond the religious to social, economic, and political
matters that require urgent attention. This he does in his latest book From Liberation to
Reconstruction. A brief excursus focusing on Mugambi's key reflections helps us appreciate
his project in winning a hearing for Africa's pressing needs.
In the fourteen chapters of From Liberation five themes emerge as key considerations
for a reconstructionist African Christian Theology in a post-world war period:
- The theology should preserve, not deprecate, the African heritage.
- It should critique the missionary enterprise so that the message delivered to the
African is truly "Good News."
- Ecumenical analyses and solutions ought to supersede scandalous and competitive
denominational posturing.
- Assessments of Africa's place in the New World Order make evident the need for a
rethinking of Pan-Africanism and the role of the Organization of African Unity.
- Reconstructive visions should highlight agricultural policies that stress production of
consumables rather than the growing of cash crops.
It is readily evident that Mugambi's concern seems to have moved beyond reflection on
who are the chosen ones. His ecumenical orientation declares that African perspectives be
given a fair hearing in deliberations and reflections about the plight of Africa's poor.
For Mugambi it is not enough simply to reject any doctrine of chosenness. What Mugambi
finds troubling about the three Mosaic religions is why each of them basks in the claim to
be the exclusively chosen channel of divine revelation. He asks, "What if none of
them have won God's favor?" In light of the religious wars which have plagued the
North Atlantic world since the early centuries of Christianity to this day, the what if
question is, for Mugambi, unavoidable. The same goes for Islam. Because all the Mosaic
religions have been ensnared by possessive authoritarianism, they find themselves
constantly subject to intra- and inter-religious traditional tension; Palestine, Bosnia,
Iran, the Southern Baptist Convention. Such a state of affairs brings Mugambi to pose two
inescapable questions. The first question is "Why should these faiths be perpetually
at war with each other?" The second question is a probing one, "Could it be that
God may no even be in their midst?"
Having placed a question mark on the Mosaic religions, Mugambi proceeds to suggest that
other religious traditions may be propounding perspectives closer to
the divine ideal. He assesses he religions of the Orient — especially Buddhism —
as being immensely tolerant and respectful of the humanity and integrity of others. The
African religious heritage, he finds to be also inclusive rather than exclusive. Realizing
that his challenge is bound to evoke a charge of Universalism on the part of many
evangelical Christians in the North Atlantic areas, Mugambi contends that his insights are
not such as to bring shame on those who accept them. He declares that when Christians of
non-EuroAmerican cultures seek a synthesis of the Christian faith with their own heritage,
a charge of universalism may after all turn out to be a virtue rather than a vice. In the
final analysis God is the final arbiter.
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