If an alleged experience of God is to provide evidence for God's existence, it must be
possible for God to be a perceptual particular: a substantive, enduring object of
perception. If several such experiences are to be cumulative evidence for God's existence,
it must be possible to re-identify God from experience to experience. I want to examine
arguments against each of these possibilities. These arguments are, respectively, a
"conceptual" and an "epistemological" argument embedded in the
writings of Richard Gale.(1)
On Gale's conceptual argument, for us to have a coherent concept of an object, O, as a
perceptual particular:
(1) We must know what it means for O to exist when not perceived.
(2) O must be able to be the common object of different experiences, and
(3) We must be able to understand the distinction between numerical and qualitative
identity with regard to O.
We need these requirements to distinguish perceptual from "phenomenal
particulars." A "phenomenal particular" cannot exist unperceived and cannot
be the common object of different experiences. Also, each occurrence of a phenomenal
particular presents a particular numerically distinct from one presented in another
occurrence. So there is no application to phenomenal particulars of the distinction
between qualitative and numerical identity.
Gale takes physical objects as the paradigm of perceptual particulars. Physical objects
having spatial-temporal location, makes possible the idea of their existing when not
perceived. Also, physical objects can be perceived by different people simultaneously
because they are all perceiving the same object at the same place, it being a conceptual
truth, says Gale, that "two material objects of the same kind cannot
spatio-temporally coincide."(2) And a person can be
said to perceive the numerically identical object O at different times because there
exists a contiguous spatial trail through which O travels, giving content to the notion of
its being the same object on different occasions.
So if God is to be a perceptual particular, God must have spatial-temporal location, or
something analogous to it. However, God does not have spatial-temporal location, or
anything analogous. Hence, God cannot be a perceptual particular.
Now, while Gale is right that spatial-temporal location is sufficient to give meaning
to the notion of an object's existing unperceived, it is hardly necessary. In God's case
in particular it is not necessary. God is conceived of as having an inner life. So when
God exists when not perceived God's inner life continues. And that's sufficient to give
content to the concept of God's existing unperceived, without God being in anything like
space.
I am aware that some philosophers object to the notion of a being not possessing a body
having an inner life. I find little value in such objections. I need not argue that point,
however, because if these philosophers were right, this would show not only that God could
not be a perceptual particular, but also that God does not exist. Gale's point, however,
is to show only that if
God does exist He could not be a perceptual particular. So I will bypass the arguments
here and declare Gale's argument unsound concerning his first requirement. Similar remarks
apply to Gale's other requirements. In order for an object, O, just to be the common
object of different experiences, it is not necessary that anyone know this. And the same
for there just being a distinction between numerical and qualitative identity. To possess
the concept, in particular, of God being the common object of different experiences, it is
sufficient that we understand that God, individuated by a certain inner life, is perceived
by several persons. It is not necessary that we be able to know when this is true. So
Gale's conceptual argument against the idea of God's just being a perceptual particular
fails.
Here now is my reconstruction of Gale's epistemological argument, where
"perceptual identity" means "having the same perceptual qualities":
(1) In order for an experience to be evidence that someone perceived an object O, it
must be possible for there to be evidence that O is the common object of different
perceptual experiences.
(2) It is possible for there be evidence that O is the common object of different
perceptual experiences only if it is possible to distinguish perceptions of O from
perceptions of objects that are perceptually identical to O.
(3) It is possible to distinguish perceptions of O from perceptions of objects that are
perceptually identical to O, only if O has spatial-temporal location, or something
analogous.
(4) However, God does not have spatial-temporal location, or anything analogous.
(5) Therefore, no experience can count as evidence that someone perceived God.
The idea is that unless it were possible for there to be evidence that O is the common
object of different perceptual experiences, one could not be justified in thinking one had
experienced a perceptual particular rather than a mere phenomenal particular. One could be
so justified only if O has spatial-temporal location. It follows that there can be no
evidence in favor of experiencing God rather than having experienced merely a
"Goddish" phenomenal content.
The epistemological argument pertains to the re-identification of an object on
different occasions. It says that if there is no way to apply the distinction between
numerical and perceptual identity, we can have no evidence that what is now perceived is
numerically identical with what is perceived on other occasions. Re-identification is
possible only if the perceptual particular exists in something at least analogous to space
and time. Being in the same space at the same time implies numerical identity, as well as
does a series of contiguous positions in space and time. Being in different spaces at the
same time or lacking a series of contiguous positions in space and time implies numerical
distinctness even if there is perceptual identity.
However, God does not exist in anything analogous to a space-time grid. Thus, there can
ever be evidence that what is experienced at two times is the same being: God. In reality,
Gale's argument, if correct, poses a problem for re-identification far beyond the confines
of the distinction between perceptual and numerical identity. After all, it is possible
for a physical object to change in appearance over time, remaining the numerically same
object. But what sense can be given to that notion, on Gale's requirements, unless the
object exists in space and time or their analogues and traces a route through them? The
answer to that question is no less difficult than the problem Gale is addressing in his
argument.
Gale's argument in effect rejects the possibility of a "holistic practice"
specific to the re-identification of God, parallel to the holistic practice of
re-identifying physical objects. Re-identifying physical objects is "holistic"
in that we determine the space an object occupies relative to re-identification of
surrounding objects, while at the same time re-identification of surrounding objects
depends on a judgment as to what space is occupied. As Peter Strawson has put it:
...the identification and distinction of places turn on the identification and
distinction of things; and the identification and distinction of things turn, in part, on
the identification and distinction of places. There is no mystery about this mutual
dependence. To exhibit its detail is simply to describe the criteria by which we
criticize, amend and extend our ascription of identity to things and places. (3)
There is no reason why the re-identification of God cannot occur within a holistic
practice, not beholden to the practice of re-identifying physical objects. We ought not
link the very notion of a "perceptual particular" to the holistic practice of
re-identifying physical objects.
It is instructive to compare perception of God to Strawson's "world of
sounds." In Individuals, Strawson presents a scheme in which a subject locates
objective sound particulars by their "position" as determined by the gradually
changing pitch of what Strawson calls the "master-sound." Being heard together
with a certain pitch of the master-sound fixes the location of a sound without the aid of
spatial features. Different locations at the master-sound yield distinct sound
particulars. Strawson thus provides a way to distinguish between numerical and perceptual
identity in a purely auditory world, on the basis of the pitch of the master-sound. In
this scheme, perceptually identical sounds are distinguished by their relationship to the
pitch of the master-sound. Now, if perceptual sound particulars can be numerically
re-identified without benefit of space, then space is not required to apply the
distinction between numerical and qualitative identity for perceptual particulars. In that
case, God could be a perceptual particular even though there xists no analogue of spatial
position for God. Gale argues against Strawson's treatment of sounds, as follows: The
position of every sound, S, other than the master-sound is determined by the pitch of the
master-sound with which S is heard. It is the difference in the pitch of the master-sound
between when S is heard and when S' is heard that determines that S and S' are numerically
distinct even if S and S' are perceptually identical. However, counter-argues Gale, S and
S' are never perceptually similar in such situations, because they have different
perceptual relational properties, namely being heard at different pitches of the
master-sound. Pitch is a perceptual quality, and relations to that quality are
perceptually discernible. Hence, in Strawson's scheme each case of perceptual identity
yields numerical identity. The case is different for spatial objects, since being in a
certain space is not a perceptual quality of an object.
Now, Strawson is aware that the individuation of sounds bears disanalogies to the
individuation of physical objects. One disanalogy is that in the world of sounds one
cannot hear different sounds together as located by the master-sound, whereas we can
apprehend distinct spatial objects together. Another disanalogy is that the location of
pitches of the master-sound are not determined holistically. The master-sound is simply
given, as the master-sound and sounds identified in relation to it. Spatial locations, on
the other hand, are identified holistically.
However, Strawson rightly declares that there is no standard by which we can determine
whether his sounds are "really" objective particulars.(4)
Strawson writes:
The resultant conceptual scheme...is not compelling. We could adopt a different
scheme...which allowed for re-identifiable universals but not for re-identifiable
particulars. What we cannot do is, as it were, to appear to accept a scheme which allows
for reidentification of sound-particulars and then to say that, of course,
particular-identity would always be in doubt....This would be the position of
philosophical scepticism about the identity of sound particulars.(5)
Strawson's point is that one could reject a conceptual scheme in which particular
sounds were reidentified as they are in his sound-world, and speak instead of
re-instantiations of sound-universals. But we could say the same for physical objects. We
could adopt an ontology of only universals and their instantiations, or of only processes,
ruling out abiding perceptual physical particulars altogether.
Mind you, I have no interest in defending Strawson's world of sounds. What does
interest me is his insight that there can be different conceptual systems each with
different criteria for perceptual particular-hood. In a penetrating examination of
Strawson's chapter on sounds, Gareth Evans raised a number of criticisms that do not apply
to the case of God.(6) Evans argues, for example, that
Strawson's sound scheme is open to phenomenalist reduction, to saying that "if the
master-sound were at pitch l, then a sound of a certain sort would be heard," rather
than that there was a substantive sound particular. Also, Evans argues that Strawson
cannot distinguish between objective particular sounds and objective sound-processes, thus
driving a wedge between objectivity and particularity. Third, Evans argues that sounds
cannot be conceived of as perceptual particulars at all, since sounds have only secondary
perceptual qualities and not primary, enduring qualities. To get a perceptual particular
in a world of sounds, declares Evans, we must import an enduring physical object which
produces the sound.
These objections do not apply to experiences of God. The latter are commonly of someone
possessed of an inner life. This makes difficult any phenomenalist reduction of God's
appearances. Similarly, experiences of God resist an interpretation of God as a process
rather than a particular. Finally, even if we were to be restrict ourselves to secondary
properties of God, experiences of God suggest that the object in question possessing these
secondary properties has an enduring inner life. So we need not posit a spatial particular
in which God's secondary properties abide.
One relevant point made by Evans (and by Jonathan Bennett ) is that Strawson could have
done without the master-sound altogether.(8) In place of it
could come a sufficient regularity of experience that supported generalizations of the
form:
An experience of kind K will intervene between any experience of kind K' and
kind K''.
A subject could then, in a holistic way, distinguish between the changes in the world
and changes in her position, in a way that could generate the notion of re-identifiable
particulars. This could be done without any master-sound. This could be especially
effective, asserts Evans, if the subject had a notion of a "block" that
accounted for her not perceiving a specific perceptual particular on certain occasions.
Now something analogous to Evans' suggestion is possible for experiences of God. Since
God is perceived to have an inner life it is possible for there to be a series of
occurrences that can be seen as expressions of a series of events in God's inner life.
This could give a sequence that a subject could attribute to a particular that persists
between experiences. This is especially possible if the subject has a sense of something
blocking the having of an experience of God. Such a block can be found in the idea that
the possibility of one's experiencing God depends to some degree upon what Merold Westphal
has called a "decentering" of oneself.(9) To
decenter oneself means to move away from being the center of one's ultimate concern, and
opening oneself to God. An inability to decenter oneself would tend to block one's ability
to be aware of God's presence. Of course we would have to apply holistically the patterns
of experience and the blocks. But in that there is nothing new.
I conclude that in principle, for experiences of God there could be a holistic
reidentification practice parallel to Evans' re-identification practice for perceptual
sound particulars sans master-sound. So, with or without the master-sound, the
epistemological objection fails for not having recognized the possibilities of different
holistic schemes in which we could have evidence for the existence of non-spatial
perceptual particulars.
I have argued that in principle there could be a re-identification practice for
experiences of God. Now I ask: what are the features of experiences of God, in a
particular religious tradition, say, which do in fact determine the re-identification of
God? I will focus here on but one such feature of experiences of God unlike that of the
experience of other objects. This feature helps determine the re-identification of God in
a non-holistic way. Remember that in Strawson's sound world, the identity, of every sound
other than the master-sound is determined by the pitch of the master-sound at which it is
heard. The identity of the master-sound is not determined by anything. The master-sound
has no location in Strawson's world of sounds. Its identity as the master-sound is simply
given in the conceptual scheme. It is that in virtue of which all location is assigned.
All else is measured by it. The role of the master-sound simply doesn't allow for
questions such as "Is that still the master-sound?" or, "Is that the
master-sound again?"
A feature of perceptions of God is that one is experiencing something which is not an
ordinary particular amongst particulars, but that in reference to which all particulars
have their existence and find their value. God is perceived to be, as it were, the
master-sound of the world. I suggest that the re-identification of God across experiences
takes place within a practice that recognizes an ontological-valuational center around
which all existence becomes organized and understood. The question of whether it is the
same center from occasion to occasion just does not arise. In the practice being
considered, it just is the same center. That's the way God functions in the conceptual
scheme attached to experiences of God. And experiences of God tend to give rise to just
such judgments.
This suggestion is reflected in a dominant feature of experiences of God, alluded to
earlier. Such experiences are thought to be available generally only to those who are
capable of a "decentering of self." The decentering of self and the perception
of God as the center are elements of the re-identification practice for God across
experiences that make the re-identification of God different in kind from the
re-identification of other perceptual particulars.
Nothing I have said proves that one object, God, rather than distinct, similar objects
is perceived in alleged experiences of God. Rather, my point is that the re-identification
practice for
God is holistic and radically different from the re-identification practice for
physical objects. I conclude that the epistemological argument fails to show that in
principle there could not be evidence from experience for the existence of God.
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