Deciding on War and Peace: The Battle for British War Powers in the Post-Iraq Era

Abstract

Tony Blair's extraordinary decision to ask for Parliament's approval for British military deployment in the Iraq War prompted lingering questions about who decides on matters of war and peace in modern Britain. His successors' use, and thereby confirmation, of the new parliamentary prerogative suggested a fundamental reorganization of war powers in British politics, giving Parliament a significantly stronger position in the realm of foreign affairs. This paper argues that a number of factors, like a Prime Minister's leadership style, the role Cabinet and the civil service, and Parliament's governing disadvantages that makes it difficult for Members of Parliament to assert themselves proactively rather than reactively, make the prospect of a "War Powers Act" enshrining Parliament's constitutional role in authorizing war highly unlikely.

Background

The evolution of British war powers is characterized by a gradual transfer of power, from the monarch, to the Prime Minister and now to Parliament. For one of the most storied military powers in the world, Britain has yet to codify these important powers in any formal way. This is in stark contrast to how war powers have been formally enshrined in other countries, like the United States. The emergence of a parliamentary prerogative in the last two decades complicates the question of who decides on matters of war and peace in Britain today.

March 18, 2003

Tony Blair gives Parliament a vote on the Iraq War, giving MPs a say on a British military action for the first time ever.

Margaret Th (Falklands

> **Tony Bla** (Iraq Wa

David Can (Libya, Syria

July 2007

Gordon Brown's Government issues a Green Paper suggesting the deployment of troops should not be decided solely by the Government.

David Mayers, Faculty Advisor I Department of Political Science, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Boston University | May 2020

Vigunthaan Tharmarajah

Prime Ministers at War

'hatcher s War)	Thatcher was at a low-point in her tenure when the Falkland Islands were invaded. Her decisive leadership during the war is largely considered to be a turning point in what would become a landmark Government in British history.	Thatcher was uncharacteristically loyal her Cabinet during the war, following to strategic decisions of her military advisors without interfering. She was often out-of-step with ministers at othe points in her premiership, prompting several high-profile resignations.
lair Var)	Blair was immensely popular having led the Labour Party to resounding victories in 1997 and 2001. At the time, it allowed him to be decisive, putting his reputation on the line in order to get what he wanted.	Blair's popularity also enabled him to dominate Cabinet in a way that few prin ministers had since Thatcher. Subseque reports on the Iraq War would condem his disregard for Cabinet norms and unusual decision-making style.
meron ia, ISIS)	Cameron was much more cautious than Blair, perhaps partly informed by the latter's tainted legacy after Iraq. Though described as a passionate interventionist, he didn't seek to defy Parliament, both in rhetoric and actions.	Cameron was unlike Blair in that he preferred collective decision-making at set up the National Security Council o his first day in office. The NSC would help guide him in military conflicts throughout his premiership.

An overview of the emergence of the parliamentary prerogative

August 29, 2013

MPs vote to block British military involvement in Syria, the first time Parliament effectively vetoed a proposed military action.

March 22, 2011

MPs approve an intervention in Libya after troops had been deployed; David Cameron promises to consult Parliament on further actions

Cameron wins a parliamentary vote on British participation in an coalition airstrikes campaign in Syria against ISIS.

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Parliament Asserts Itself

Tony Blair's decision to give Parliament an a priori vote before the Iraq War set a precedent on how Britain went to war. Blair was not constitutionally mandated to do so, and his successors could well have chosen to break with the precedent. Ultimately, David Cameron would help cement it, not only repeatedly asking for the approval of MPs but also accepting their veto, as he did in 2013. His successor, Theresa May, however chose to bypass Parliament in 2018 when she joined allies in coalition airstrikes in Syria.

Implications

May's decision, taken in the context of her predecessors' actions, casts significant doubt on the prospects of a "War Powers Act" that would formalize Parliament's role in authorizing military actions. Indeed it suggests that the parliamentary prerogative that has emerged since Iraq, and many have come to equate to law, remains at the mercy of the executive, and his or her willingness to cede power.

April 14, 2018

Theresa May does not ask for Parliament's approval before joining U.S. and French allies in launching air strikes against the Syrian government.

December 2, 2015

