LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI
On Collective Identity
W
HEN WE CONSIDER THE QUESTION
of the identity of human
collective bodies (keeping in mind the obvious caveat that all
definitions of non-mathematical objects will inevitably be
shaky and imprecise), we observe that it is analogous to the time-hal–
lowed problem of personal identity discussed by Locke, Hume, and
many contemporary philosophers. Conversely, certain aspects of per–
sonal identity have their equivalents in collective identity. In short, it is
impossible to talk of one without considering the other.
Of the aspects common to both personal and collective identity, the
first is substance, or soul-the non-material aspect of personality-and
the problem of its connection with the body. This connection has been
defined in a variety of ways, depending on the metaphysical doctrine
one chooses to adopt-Platonic, Thomist, Augustinian, or Cartesian .
For as long as the concept of substance (whether considered to be a sep–
arate entity or, as in Aquinas, a composite of body and its form, i.e., the
soul) retained its unquestioned legitimacy in philosophical discour e
and was accepted as the immutable seat of mental life, the thing that
preserves its
ipseitas
through all changes, personal identity was easi ly
defined by reference to it. But once empiricist critique had undermined
and dethroned it, pointing out that its presence cou ld not be established,
either directly or indirectly, substance was demoted from the status of
empirical fact to that of metaphysical presupposition. Of course, the
dogmas of empiricism are themselves hardly immune from criticism, in
particular from the (frequently made) charge of being arbitrary. How–
ever, even if we abandon the idea of substance, we are still left with the
problem of how to define the experience of self-the "I" at the root of
personal identity.
The experience of the continuous "I" presupposes memory. Memory
is the second element inherent in the idea of personal identity, and it is
an essential one . There wou ld be no continuity of identity if the entire
memory of a person were erased; there can be no personal identity
Editor's Note: Excerpted from
My Correct Views on Everything
(St.
Augustine's Press).
