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was the only exception). This concealed anti-Americanism might easily
turn into open manifestations, such as President Bush witnessed at the
beginning of his presidency.
Anti-Americanism is understandable in post-Soviet Russia, where it is
related, among other things, to the disappointing developments since
the end of the Soviet era and the Russian elite's lingering nationalistic
ambitions. But in Western Europe, anti-American sentiment is relatively
new. Yes, the European Left has been at it for years, but never has it
been accompanied by outright disagreement with any American presi–
dent among his strongest European allies. This cooling cannot be attrib–
uted to President Bush's personal characteristics, nor to the fact that he
represents the Republican Party. Neither the Americans nor the Euro–
peans need each other as much as they did during the Cold War, when
the Soviet Union posed a real threat.
Today, Russia no longer poses the danger it once did. Instead,
to
the
American establishment, China has become the "evil empire" of the
twenty-first century. The other chief threat is international terrorism, at
the moment of Islamic origin. Because of these shifts and ever-changing
relationships, European allies have lost a degree of importance, so that
some among the American elite regard Europe as just another economic
competitor. At the same time, our European allies no longer appreciate
or need the United States as much as they did during the Cold War.
The end of World War II left behind a devastated Europe. With a
weakened economy and the reality of the Soviet threat, Europeans
accepted American hegemony. Even France, which has always been
somewhat anti-American, became more open
to
America's European
presence after the U.S.S.R. invaded Afghanistan. But with the end of the
Cold War, European nations began to create a military force
to
make
them less dependent on NATO. The proverbial last straw came with the
American missile shield project that would protect only the United
States from nuclear attack. Europeans viewed this as proof that Amer–
ica had little regard for its allies.
Post-Soviet Russia, with its peculiar, twisted semi-criminal feudalism
that tightly connects possessions and power, is drasticall y d iHerent from
the rest of Europe. Russia still wants to be one of the leaders in the
European community and could hardly accept being relegated to yet
another Poland. But there remains the threat of negative change, such as
a nationalistic dictatorship or even total disintegration and chaos. And
Russia's size and geographic location make it more of an Asian than a
European country, preventing a smooth integration into the rest of
