DAVID SIDORSKY
543
Generalizing from this extreme situation, the existentialist concept of
freedom serves to vindicate the choice for action, independent of any
rational estimation of its consequences or of the probabilities that it will
achieve its desired ends. The agent makes the choice of participating or
desisting from an action that may well be counterproductive, because he
recognizes that he is
engage
in this situation, and is free to choose. His
acts of free choice, even if they are arbitrary commitments which do not
reflect the historical givens of the situation or form part of a coherent
purposive design, mark the creation of an authentic self.
The commitment to arbitrary choices is an expression of the self
through which it becomes an authentic self. The connection between the
concept of liberty and the creation of the authentic self can be under–
stood as a continuum between the "given" and the "taken." The sphere
of the "given" consists of those features of the individual which are
determined by nature, history, and society; the sphere of the "taken"
consists of those aspects of the individual or his environment which are
open to transformation by the exercise of free choice. The way this line
is drawn serves as a general indicator of the distinction between liberal–
ism and conservatism.
For the conservative, the area ascribed to the "given," whether this
be the constraints of nature, the burdens of history, or the obligations of
a tradition, occupies a crucial portion of the continuum. For the liberal,
there is a belief that the choices available to the individual, either in fact
or in possibility, extend over virtually the whole of the continuum.
The distinction can be clarified by simple illustrations . In an
extremely traditionalist society, for example, the choice of a spouse and
the decision for a vocation may be prescribed by the social order rather
than taken by the agent. Marriages are arranged for the succeeding gen–
eration by the parents, often before the birth of the children. The voca–
tion of a child may be hereditary or given by the vocation of his parent
or the group into which he is born. A liberal conception moves the
determination of choice of vocation and of spouse away from the oblig–
ations or prescriptions of the tradition to the domain of individual
choices.
The ascription of nationality or religion provides a second and more
controversial example in the continuum of the "given" and the "taken."
In both traditionalist or moderately liberal societies, the individual is
obligated to accept as a given the religion or the nationality of the fam–
ily or group into which he is born. The abdication or refusal to accept
the obligations of nationality that derive from origins or roots is viewed
as treason in a traditionalist framework. The violation of obligation to
