RONALD RADOSH
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that at least liberals had to be clear about what it was that Owen Latti–
more believed.
In
a similar fashion, writers for the socialist anti-Communist publi–
cation, the
New Leader,
joined in. Granville Hicks, himself once a liter–
ary Communist, reserved his anger for liberals who he thought played
into McCarthy'S hands by "rallying with such absolute assurance to
Lattimore's defense," especially since even if he was innocent, "he may
still be wrong in his views on China." The publication's editor, Sol Lev–
itas, wrote that Lattimore was guilty of a worse sin than being a spy.
Proclaiming the China scholar to be a "LitAg" of the Kremlin, Levitas
wrote that he was an individual who sought to harm American foreign
policy by molding public opinion to favor a pro-Soviet course. Such a
service made him of more value to Stalin than a thousand other actual
American Communists.
Irving Kristol offered by far the most comprehensive view of the Lat–
timore case. Kristol's position was made clear in his lengthy and
provocative discussion of Owen Lattimore.
It
was this essay, Diana
Trilling had written in her own discussion of Lattimore, that was "the
most telling statement I have yet seen of the exact nature of Lattimore's
offense." Kristol did what few other liberal commentators did; he read
and learned from the McCarran Committee's report on the Institute for
Pacific Relations. First, Kristol examined Lattimore's own testimony
before the Tydings Committee. Kristol argued that in
I935
and
I936,
Lattimore had favored a tough American policy towards Japan, at a
time when the Communists "were insisting that the United States inter–
vene to prevent Japan from gobbling up China." Lattimore, in other
words, had confirmed exactly how his own positions dovetailed with
those of the Soviet Union.
Taking up McCarthy's charge that it was Lattimore and the other
China hands that had lost China, Kristol argued that what they had
actually done was support denial of aid to Chiang Kai-Shek unless he
agreed to a coalition government with Mao and the Chinese Commu–
nists. The inevitable result of their proposals, Kristol argued, would be
a result that Lattimore and others "smugly and foolishly thought to be
the only 'constructive' programme suitable for their advanced political
sensibilities. " Agreeing that Lattimore "was no spy in the sense that
Alger Hiss was," and that McCarthy's description of him "was irre–
sponsible and wide of the mark," Kristol argued that Lattimore was
nevertheless an individual who posed a real danger to American policy.
He was, Kristol wrote, a man transported "by the conviction of his own
infinite innocence and righteousness." Thus he saw Lattimore as the
