BOOKS
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rists as self-proclaimed emperors parading around without clothes.
I mention the much-aired Sokal hoax not only because Ian Hacking
and Michael Ruse give it significant attention in their respective books
but also because the flap itself sets the framework for what might be
called "Social Construction: Round II." For Hacking, what matters
most in the talk, pro and con, about social construction is the
what
at
the immediate issue. Is it facts or gender, quirks or reality? Is it a per–
son, an object, or an idea? Ruse puts it a slightly different way when he
proposes that we may have been asking the wrong questions all along,
and that, rightly seen, what we have is a situation in which both camps
can mount strong arguments:
Our ultimate concern [Ruse argues] is surely with the issue of real–
ism. Does an objective "real world" exist "out there" that can be
known through the methods of science, or is science a subjective
construction corresponding to shifting contingencies of culture and
history, with nothing "real" beneath it? Are the epistemic norms of
science guaranteed to lead us to a knowledge of this world, and if
so why? Or are the epistemic norms also simply part of culture in
the end, on a par with the metaphors of science? I worry about
these questions [which Ruse obviously feels are the right ones], and
now candor forces me to admit that-on the evidence we have–
one could reasonably argue for either realism or nonrealism!
That is, one can make a case for Karl Popper who believes that there is
indeed a "real world" out there. We may never know it exactly, but (in
Ruse's words) "'truth' is the correspondence of our ideas with this
world, and the aim and method of science is to approach such truth, if
only asymptotically"; or one can make an equally compelling case for
Thomas Kuhn who believes that "there is no reality other than that seen
through and created by the paradigm." His fair-mindedness (if that is
what Ruse's waffling comes to) reminds me of the Yiddish joke about
the rabbi who listens to a couple seeking a divorce. The husband begins
first, outlining his grievances (she is a lousy cook, a sloppy housekeeper,
etc.). The rabbi gazes thoughtfully at the ceiling and proclaims, "You're
right!" He then goes on to hear what the maligned wife has to say (her
husband is a lazy bum, and beats her to boot), and after giving the ceil–
ing another look, announces: "You're right!" "But rabbi," a witness
interjects, "how can they both be right?" Stroking his beard, the rabbi
sidesteps the contradiction with this playful retort:
"Nu,
so you're also
right!"
