NATHAN G. HALE,JR.
251
the psychoanalytic theory of symbolism represented an attempt to do so.
The discussions of free association in
Studies in Hysteria
indicate clearly the
intricate nature of the process. A cookbook for psychoanalysis or analyti–
cal psychology may in fact be an impossibility because so much of the
validity of an interpretation depends on the fit of a variety of factors, as any
inspection of Freud's
Psychopathology
if
Everyday
Life--or
his case histo–
ries-would surely confirm. What Freud did require was that those who
wished to use psychoanalysis learn it on an apprenticeship basis-a not
unreasonable request. BothJung and Bleuler argued against the opponents
of psychoanalysis that valid criticism had to be based on the proper use of
the psychoanalytic method itself. And how would this be learned? Clearly,
from another analyst. Precisely that basis obtains in academia and in much
of science, subject of course to peer review. But in the case of early psy–
choanalysis, who were the peers? Bleuler did raise a vital point in his
letters to Freud, that the Freudians were excluding those who disagreed
wi
th them from their new societies' meetings. In fact, Jung seems to have
been the first to do so in Zurich, not Freud in Vienna. And Freud's letters
to Sandor Ferenczi indicate that he gave considerable weight to Alfred
Adler's arguments in dealing with some of his own patients.
Perhaps my imagination is defective, but I have been unable to visu–
alize what Kerr or Sulloway might suggest as a truly scientific exchange
over psychoanalytic matters in those years. Neither Kerr nor Sulloway,
to my knowledge, has elaborated such a vision. Sulloway suggests that
when Boyle wished to have his ideas tested, he gave directions for the
reproduction of his air pump, which others proceeded to do. But this is
a naive response to the challenge of psychotherapy. It hardly resembles
making an air pump. Psychotherapy is a highly complex human interac–
tion. In fact, only now with sophisticated recording and statistical
techniques are we beginning to develop a true technology for the study
of psychoanalysis and the effects of treatment and interpretation. As
Joseph Weiss, who has done conscientious work in this field, has repeat–
edly said, good research in psychoanalysis is extremely difficult-and
expensive.
This leads me back to Crews' eloquendy argued thesis. Crews seems
to believe that there is an ineluctable, indubitably established set of scien–
tific psychological truths about important matters, proven by flawless
experimental methods.
However, academic psychologists pursue a set of agreed-upon proce–
dures for establishing the "scientific" nature of particular findings in
relatively delimited areas of human experience. These methods are: agree–
ment on the meaning of terms, i.e., operational definitions, and the use of
statistical methods to assess results. In that sense psychology is scientific.
