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then the Czechs prevented them from acquiring a normal relationshi p to
their state. Such a relationship might have enabled them to build up gen–
erations of political elites in the nineteeenth century and to mature as a
political nation together with other European nations. This new state had
to appear to accelerate the process, so Slovaks could enter the twenty-first
century without any handicap. The myth is predicated on the idea of the
linear development of nations and the belief that the nation state is the
foundation of human happiness. In the hierarchy of values, according to
this myth, the individual and his right to happiness are not paramount.
It
is the nation state that automatically makes an individual happy by its very
existence. Concomitant to this idea is the conclusion that the state does
not necessarily have to be democratic, since democracy and excessive free–
dom might threaten the power of the state.
Mter five years of existence, it is clear that the politicians who found–
ed the state and are still in power have concluded that democracy threatens
not only their personal power, but also the existence of the state itself.
This evolution occurred right before my eyes, as if the players were
following a handbook on the establishment of a dictatorship. Vladimir
Meciar, a key figure in Slovak politics of the 1990s, began as a former
Communist who had nothing to do with the revolution of November
1989, but who, a month later, understood that the system had collapsed and
that the new situation offered opportunities to anyone. The circumstances
of his arrival on the political stage are bizarre. He became minister of the
interior on the basis of a competition organized by the erstwhile revolu–
tionaries. He stunned everyone with his ability to think systematically and
with his rhetorical talents. Soon he became prime minister. The desperate
politicians who discovered yet another of his unusual characteristics
recalled him as a pathological liar who also had a phenomenal memory
which he used in demagogic attacks against his enemies. But he soon
became the most popular politician in Slovakia, a mythical hero who
would bring his nation happiness and prosperity. At first, Meciar still
believed in democracy, because a majority of voters returned him twice to
his prime ministerial seat. When he was dividing Czechoslovakia, togeth–
er with the the'n prime minister of the Czech Republic, Mr. Vaclav Klaus,
he even bequeathed to Slovakia a constitution which, with its many faults,
nevertheless is a democratic constitution. Today, five years later, he realizes
that democracy is a threat to him, because he is hated by the majority of
Slovaks. The citizens took a long time, but they finally understood what
democratic politicians saw a long time ago: that his unusual personal char–
acteristics mask a great danger for them. Now, some consider him to be
mentally ill, an amoral person of great intellect; others see him as an evil
demon. This knowledge came too late, since the time when Meciar could
