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pulled out of Mghanistan, decided to give up its East European depen–
dencies, and allowed the greater domestic freedoms which, contrary to its
hopes, doomed the system. Kennan's notions of how the Soviet Union
could become more tolerant did not seem to be supported by the familiar
historical events.
Events
in
the former Soviet Union did not lend substance to Kennan's
belief that "if what we want to achieve is liberalization of the political
regime in the Soviet Union, then it is to example rather than to precept
we must look; and we could start by tackling. . .some of the glaring defi–
ciencies in our own society." While few of us could question the existence
of these deficiencies their relevance to the liberalization of the Soviet sys–
tem always was negligible.
Kennan treats the impending collapse of the Soviet Union, and the
causes and circumstances of the collapse, in an almost cursory, matter-of–
fact fashion . Although he did not predict this collapse, many of his earlier
assessments could have anticipated it, in particular the theme that Soviet
rulers were justifiably insecure, presiding as they did over an essentially
weak system. But perhaps the total and rapid unravelling of the Soviet
Union was not an idea especially close to Kennan's heart given his misgiv–
ings about the wisdom of American foreign policy and leadership; he
might not have cherished the prospect of a world dominated by one super–
power he has always viewed with considerable ambivalence. It is also
possible that because of his more recent and far greater preoccupation with
decline and decadence in American society he overlooked how far Soviet
society had decayed, including its moral glue.
This is not to say that Kennan did not have "strong premonitions of
impending change in Russia." He observes correcdy (in one of the few
parts of the book devoted to the collapse) that "the ideology inherited
from Lenin was no longer really there to support this system. It remained
as a lifeless orthodoxy. ..." And he lays much blame on the Soviet econo–
my and especially its overcentralization and the lack of incentives.
Given Kennan's credentials as a critic of U.S. foreign policy his obser–
vations about the origins of the Cold War are noteworthy and should give
litde comfort to the unrepentant Cold War revisionists committed to the
belief in America's overwhelming responsibility. In one of his 1985 essays
Kennan writes of his efforts after World War II "to persuade Washington
that dreams of a happy collaboration with this regime are quite unreal...
that Stalin and his associates are now elated with their recent military and
political successes and think they see favorable prospects for extending
their political influence over all of Europe. ..."
On the other hand to insist, as he does, that "nobody 'won' the Cold
War" is a questionable proposition. Mter all, the Soviet Union did not sur-
