STEPHEN MILLER
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driven by a passionate hatred of religion: "the first, last and middle Object
of their Hostility, is religion."
In his writings of the 1790s, Burke often dwelled on the evils of anti–
clericalism. The French revolutionaries, he said, have championed "an
insolent irreligion in opinions and practices." The nationalization of
church property, Burke argues, was only the first step in the National
Assembly's war against traditional religion. "These enthusiasts do not scru–
ple to avow their opinion, that a state can subsist without any religion
better than with one...." The attacks against traditional religion, Burke
says, were part of a larger scheme to destroy all established authority. "The
Republicans in France, and their associates in other countries, make it
always their business, and often their publick profession, to destroy all
traces of antient establishments...." Tearing down ancient establishments,
Burke argues, rends the fabric of civil society. Instead of manners that
nourish affection and trust, there is revolutionary fervor, which foments
hatred and distrust.
One word sums up Burke's view of the force behind the Revolution:
enthusiasm, a term that in the eighteenth century often meant fanaticism.
The Revolution, he said in 1791, is "this strange, nameless, wild, enthusi–
astic thing...." In the past, enthusiasm usually had a religious content, but
the French Revolution was driven by a secular enthusiasm that took the
form of political millennialism-the conviction that the Revolution
would usher in a golden age of liberty, equali ty, and fraterni ty. Burke
thought political millennialism was a destructive force.
"It
is now obvious
to the world, that a theory concerning government may become as much
a cause of fanaticism as a dogma in religion." In the name of revolution–
ary patriotism horrible crimes had been committed already and would
continue to be committed. Burke predicted that the revolutionaries would
have no qualms about killing the king.
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Political millennialists, Burke says, not only hate prescription-i.e. tra–
dition-they also dislike prejudice, which for Burke is mainly a positive
notion: the stock of opinions one has absorbed, so to speak, from one's
family and background. Burke doesn't say that all forms of prejudice are
good, but he suggests that many are. "Prejudice renders a man's virtue his
habit; and not a series of unconnected acts. Through just prejudice, his
duty becomes a part of his nature." Society cannot function without "just
prejudice" because it promotes morality. "The moral sentiments, so nearly
connected with early prejudice as to be almost one and the same thing, will
assuredly not live long under a discipline, which has for its basis the
destruction of all prejudices...."
Prescription and prejudice are the basis of what Burke calls manners,
by which he means a respect and affection for society's established institu-
