392
PARTISAN IliVIEW
selfishness. In dealing with post-commmunist perplexities, we have to dis–
cover the role of mentalities, their persistence in spite of the break-up of
institutions. Whatever its cruelties, and they were countless, whatever its
barbarism, which was indeed abysmal, Leninism attacked the very founda–
tions of the ancient communitarian cohesion. It did not create a sense of
individual autonomy, but it did bring industry and urban life into most of
these societies.
The revolt against Leninism included a negative counterpart- a revolt
against the distorted modernity it had ferociously imposed on these
nations. Most citizens resented the Leninist commissar's iron fist, and his
imposition of urban life, destruction of village life, aggression against
archaic, pastoral, traditional values. Leninism, which was a Russian varia–
tion on the Western socialist dream of modernization, has profoundly and
destructively shaken these societies. Too little liberalism existed in the
region after World War I for the pursui t of such a radical agenda of
restructuring, except in Czechoslovakia. In most of these countries during
the interwar period, strong millennial movements of the extreme right
engaged in visceral attacks on liberal democracy. The Romanian Iron
Guard, with its spiritualist pageants and cult of heroic death, was only the
most visible among them. And the aftermath of Leninism's collapse has
therefore witnessed the resurgence of these communitarian, neo-romantic
mythologies of belonging and origins.
The question, therefore, is what polity the East European nations will
hold to. Will they choose the problematic, dubiously created modern soci–
ety as it emerged as part of "socialist industrialization," or will they return
to the previous cult of autarchic community and profoundly anti-Western
sentiments? Will the nativist, romantic-populist forces that have been res–
urrected in post-communist societies get the upperhand, or will they be
defeated by the partisans of Westernization and liberal modernity? The
socialist dream of reconciling modernity (industrial dynamism) and com–
munity (the reduction or elimination of plurality and diversity, especially
of private property as a source of social differentiation) failed. Russia,
Ukraine, and East-Central Europe as a whole once again fa ce the old
dilenuna: accepting the Western route
to
modernity, or retrenchment into
the values of the
Volk,
the village, archaic roots, the tribe. The importance
of the anti-modern myth is thus critical for understanding both pre- and
post-conununist anti-liberalism. Part of anti-communist rhetoric half a
decade after the collapse of communism concealed in effect a secret fear:
that the post-communist polis will continue communism's onslaught on
rural, communitarian, and traditional values. Hence, the immediate succes–
sor societies have experienced immoderate calls for punishment and the
rise of neo-populist, often anti-Western movements of anger. Given the
