Vol. 64 No. 2 1997 - page 239

FROM CASES OF HYSTERIA TO THE THERAPEUTIC SOCIETY
239
bit of a romantic and believe in something beyond the concrete, something
like a soul that is very different from the soma. Indeed, in German, Freud's
word for psyche was soul
(Seele).
Therefore how you relate the physical to
the psychological is still a big question and that is a kind of a problem. I
also agree that we are going to get answers to everything, but the answers
are going to change all the time. That doesn't make them any less useful,
because for the time being they're the best possible explanation, but it does
not make them more truthful, just more useful.
By the way, I share with you your optimism about the physical sci–
ences and psychoanalysis. I do not agree at all wi th the current notion that
psychoanalysis is dead. It is active and very much alive.
I won't rediscuss the subjectivism of intersubjective issues at length at
this point, except to reiterate that there is a big trend toward the notion
that psychoanalysis is not a one-person objective observer system, but a
two-person system with two subjective entities enacting the process; and
even though these persons are not equal partners, it is suggested that this
intersubjective process creates a new narrative between the two participants
in the dialogue, a new narrative truth that is extraordinarily meaningful and
useful, but has little to to with objective historical truth and facts.
Leon Cooper:
I really don't disagree with you, but I'd like to elaborate a
little bit. That is, after all, what professors do. Do facts exist?
An
old and
deep philosophical question, "Does the external world exist?" gets us right
back to Bishop Berkley, even Plato. My own view is that, of course, our
perpections of the world are influenced by our own state of mind. One of
my colleagues once said, "People say that seeing is believing, but in fact in
many cases you have to believe in order to see." That's perfectly true, but to
paraphrase Orwell, all facts are equal but some are more equal than others.
For example, if you shine sunlight through a spectroscope and look at it
carefully you will see certain dark lines. These are the famous Fraunhofer
lines and, as far as I know, almost all people who look will agree that the
lines are there. They will be there in specific places whether the observers
are sad or not sad, etc. I think we can agree that events do exist that most
people more or less agree on, even though they may influence them
in
very
different ways. When we construct a theory of knowledge the question
might be,"assuming that there is an external world, how can we organize it
with a mind that's so imperfect?" I know there is a problem, but I think
generally we can distinguish "facts" from our feelings about them.
Another issue. You stated that there might be physiological bases for
various mental states, the various concepts of analysis, but you weren't sure
if there would be any use to get them; I have the feeling that you don't
even like the idea. But whether we like it or not, we'll very likely find that
what we call "soul" is some configuration of material objects. I'm not saying
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