STEPHEN MILLER
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to define this different kind of truth, he spoke of a truth that is the out–
come of a ritual "ordeal." This truth is "provoked by rituals; it is attained
by tricks, one seizes it only by chance: through strategy and not method."
Though Foucaul t often spoke of the poli tical implications of this new
form of truth, he also implied that a limit-experience might be its own
reward - a moment of personal truth and freedom that does not necessar–
ily lead to a political transformation. He implied that "the revolutionary
experience," like the experience of taking drugs or engaging in bizarre
sexual practices such as sadomasochism, is a transforming experience even
if its poli tical implications are not cl ear.
In
1982, two years before he died, Foucault maintained that he still
wanted to "create a new way of life," yet in his later years he seemed to
be less interested in political transformation than in finding a way to free
himself from the burden of selfhood, a way, as he put it, of desubjectify–
ing oneself. Sometimes, however, he spoke of the need to "invent himself."
In
the darkness of the self, the difference between these two quests is not
easy to discern.
Foucault's preoccupation with defining the self may seem to be in
accord with Nietzsche's injunction "to become what one is," but
Nietzsche was not preoccupied with either finding or losing the self, and
he probably would have regarded Foucault's preoccupation with the
"limit-experience" contemptible, a sign of decadence. Foucault, though, is
a descendant of Nietzsche insofar as he also cast a shadow on disinter–
estedness and put truth in quotation marks. Yet Foucault goes much
further than Nietzsche in his repudiation of disinterestedness and objec–
tivity.
Foucault's star is on the wane in France, but epistemological
hypochondria remains a powerful force in the American academy, as is
apparent from the following statement on the future of the humanities,
made by the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) in a recent
pamphlet: "As the most powerful modern philosophies and theories have
been demonstrating, claims of disinterest, objectivity, and universality are
not to be trusted, and themselves tend to reflect local historical condi–
tions." The most powerful modern philosophies (whatever "powerful"
means) have demonstrated no such thing, for it is impossible to demon–
strate, that is, to give concl usive proof, that claims of disinterest are not to
be trusted.
If
the ACLS is merely saying that everyone is to some degree
driven by self-interest, it is uttering a meaningless truism that has no bear–
ing on the question of evaluating scholarship.
If
the ACLS is saying that
judging the quality of someone's scholarship is well-nigh impossible
because everyone is a prisoner of a "regime of truth," it is endorsing rad–
ical subjectivism.
