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PARTISAN REVIEW
himself to the Big Picture, meaning the Franco-German Alliance,
European unity, and a series of architectural projects - such as the huge
new National Library in Paris - which would be his proudest legacy, he
said, since French law and tradition put few restraints on the monarchical
power of the Pontifex Maximus to decide, e.g. whether to build Mr. Pei's
pyrarnide
in the courtyard of the Louvre, or how to close the great per–
spective to the west of the Champs Elysees.
In foreign affairs, his policy hardly departed, at first, except in style,
from the course set by de Gaulle under quite different circumstances, i.e.,
when the seemingly solid Soviet Empire extended into central Europe.
Indeed, his finest hour prior to the dramatic events of 1989 was a distinctly
Gaullian speech to the Bundestag urging that the Germans stand firm
during the so-called missile crisis. Later, when the Evil Empire was col–
lapsing, he reacted rather grudgingly and ineptly, vexing the Germans by
appearing to regret the withdrawal of the Russians from Berlin and the
sudden disappearance of the DDR, then committing the opposite error:
excessive haste in encouraging the breakup of Yugoslavia. He seemed to
resign himself too readily to the attempted coup against Gorbachev, so that
when the coup failed, French policy once again looked confused and
inept. The truth was that the French had a quandary, not a policy, because
all these events signalled a telluric movement, a shift in the European bal–
ance of power in favor of the Federal Republic, and no one was ready for
it, least of all the Germans, who seemed to have kicked the habit of seek–
ing to dominate their neighbors - but who knew how long that would
last? The question arose inevitably, especially to people of Mitterrand's
generation, and the conventional answer was European integration.
This was not a belief in federalism or any other ideology or system of
government. It was the idea, developed and cherished by centrist politi–
cians during the Fourth Republic, a period during which Mitterrand
served in a dozen ministerial posts, that the French could make up for
their relative economic weakness by their superiority in mental dexterity
and rhetoric, i.e., by exerting political leadership in the Commission of the
E.C.,
based in Brussels, the parliament in Strasbourg, and other European
institutions through which the Germans (having exorcized their old
demons) would be bound irrevocably to the West.
Not a bad bet, considering the alternatives. A hope, at least, for the
European future, although the prospects for it seemed more plausible
when the Federal Republic was only a rump of the old Reich and Russian
tanks were stationed about fifteen miles from Hamburg.... Mitterrand, in
any event, spent what remained of his political credit and his physical
strength presiding over the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty and per–
suading the French people to ratify it. In this effort he had the support of
