EUGENE GOODHEART
tradition is gratefully invoked by freeloading atheists like myself, who
would like to let differences like that between the Kantian and the
Hegelian remain "merely philosophical."
233
Rorty has betrayed himself by confessing to the pragmatic necessity of
the "Jewish and Christian element," which derives its force from its uni–
versalist conception of human dignity. "Freeloading atheist" indeed: he
wants the benefits of universalism without subscribing to its philosophical
foundations. This allows him to have his cake and eat it, but it does not
solve the problem of what should be done when communal ideas collide.
On what basis, from a Rortyan perspective, can it be determined whether
a communal idea is corrupt? Rorty leaves no room for passing authorita–
tive judgment on the moral character of a community or society - even
totalitarian and authoritarian societies. But then Rorty doesn't see the
problem. In place of adjudication between rival views, he offers the con–
solation of interminable conversation. He admits that "we don't know
how it would feel. We don't know whether, given such a change in tone,
the conversation of Europe might not falter and die away." But the
thought of the disappearance of the European conversation (an odd cos–
mopolitan locution for a particularist like Rorty) seems to stir no anxiety
in him. His anti-universalist conception of solidarity has its roots not in
liberalism, but in conservative thinking. It recalls Joseph de Maistre's as–
sertion: "There is no such thing as
man
in the world. I have seen, during
my life, Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc. But as far as
man
is concerned,
I declare that I have never in my life met him; if he exists, he is unknown
to me."
Does a liberalism aware of the epistemological difficulties of estab–
lishing grounds for objectivist claims need to take the peculiarly
vulnerable form it assumes in Rorty's work? Leszek Kolakowski suggests
another way. He insists on comparing and evaluating the differences be–
tween cultures and perspectives on
moral
grounds, because he knows that
cultures (including his own) are capable of barbarism. He can then preach
universal intolerance of barbaric acts, regardless of where they occur. In
Kolakowski the challenge to universalism stops short of tolerance for bar–
barism, and he can assert with a moral confidence that does not require
support from epistemology that "a culture capable of valu[ing] tolerance
in public life" and "skepticism in .. . intellectual work" is superior to
cultures that don't. Paradoxically, this entails intolerance of intolerance
and an unwillingness to allow a radical skepticism to undermine the con–
dition of openness. Kolakowski affirms an "inconsistent skepticism" and
"an inconsistent universalism." He defends the liberal idea with vigor. In
