62
PAR.TISAN REVIEW
IS
over. Reality is mu ch more complicated , turbulent , and dull ,
promising little for the future. None of this was anticipated during those
glorious days when the empire was dissolving and Lithuania became the
first state on its march towards Europe. The present confusion and the
spreading chaos contrast sharply with the completely different visions
evoked on the road to freedom and independence. Lithuania was seen as
a prosperous country that would equal its Western counterparts as soon
as the Soviets retreated. When they did, expectations were high,
sustained by charismatic political visions and encouraged by much-loved
politicians who promised everything Lithuanian society lacked during the
years of oppression. The dream endured for some time, before it gave
way to witness a complete disaster in poli cy-making, agriculture,
industry, and social welfare. The voices of the political leaders were
soothing: it's the past we have to fight now to see our dreams
materialized. The "hand of Moscow" was seen around every corner.
Critical remarks were openly discouraged. Even the media was cursed
and detested by the highest "national" authorities. Something indeed
was rotten in the "Danish kingdom. "
Many of these problems were fundamentally programmed by earlier
political developments. When the national resurgence movement
Sajlldis
was established to back up the Soviet reforms, it transformed itself into a
power that fought for independence but did not look beyond the goal
of independence . Initially, the movement was opposed
to
the formation
of independent political parties. Thus, fledgling political parties appeared
on the stage quite late, like infants lacking a good babysitter.
Meanwhile, Lithuania's Communist party, with a membership of two
hundred thousand during the last years of Soviet power declared itself in
support of the "fight for independence" in a peace ful way. Even with a
decrease in membership , it remained a strong, influential and well-struc–
tured political force, promoting its own imposing leader. The main
shortcoming of the newly emerging political parties was that they were
created in the images of already existing and visible political leaders,
modeled on prewar parties. The classical definitions of left and right
were therefore constantly mixed. The inability of right-wing nationals to
effect the promised reforms (reconstruction of agriculture and privatiza–
tion of industry failed immediately, followed by complete chaos in legis–
lation), together with a deteriorating state bureaucracy, resulted in a sit–
uation common to a number of other Eastern and Central European
states. The comeback of old political forces was rapid and met with little
resistance. A shift to the left with a change of political power promised
no greater stability. The crime rate increased; social security continued
to
collapse; and inflation decreased only in the data provided by the
