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did not say that truth as such is a repressive notion. They did not there–
fore suggest that in the name of toleration we should avoid or suspend
truth. They did not even allow that there could be several truths of equal
validity and that therefore no truth could
e~oy
superiority. Locke be–
lieved that his religion was the true one. Voltaire saw nothing reprehen–
sible in the fact that some religions were dominant in certain societies,
and that those who belonged to these religions were given leading politi–
cal positions. He thought it natural that certain government functions
were thus not accessible to some people because of their religious beliefs.
By modern standards this does not seem a particularly libertarian position,
but it is reconcilable with the general idea of toleration. Hierarchy and
intolerance are two different things. The aim of toleration is not to be a
substitute for equality, justice, and other moral and political qualities.
Toleration cannot make any positive claims such as that a certain category
of persons should be given certain political or social positions, specifically
on the grounds of toleration.
From the beginning, however, it was obvious that the advocates of
toleration were tempted to transcend the narrow limits of the negative
version. The temptation was to make it more committed in the struggle
for a better world, more partisan, more positive. The decisive step toward
a positive interpretation was to neutralize certain points of view and to
promote others; to oppose those philosophies, religions, and social norms
which are coercive, dominating, authoritarian, monolithic; and to support
other philosophies, religions, and social norms that do not have these un–
pleasant characteristics. Thus, toleration would no longer be blind, un–
committed, indifferent to the final result of the dispute between contend–
ing parties. On the contrary, it would be a major actor in the dispute,
strengthening one party and withdrawing its support from the other.
It
would consist not in refraining from doing certain things, but in acting in
a certain way, in choosing and committing oneself to the cause of free–
dom. By being passive, by not choosing and committing oneself, one ran
the risk of becoming an unwitting accomplice to the intolerant party.
The history of the last two hundred years of Western political philos–
ophy may be interpreted, among other things, as a gradual decline of
negative toleration and a simultaneous growth of its positive counterpart.
Most of these efforts have aimed at no less than the discovery of the final
key to the tolerant world, that is, the creation of a framework of ethical
guidelines which effectively prevent intolerance. To put it yet differently,
there has been the hope that the forces of toleration could finally achieve
victory in the war against the forces of intolerance, or - even if reality
proves resistant - that at least we will have a clear formula of the strategy
and the general goal. This tradition extends from John Stuart Mill - who
located the source of oppression in the customs and social stereotypes
