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PARTISAN REVIEW
tary (the national guard), and that the guerrillas had little popular support.
In
fact
... the first significant "Contra" military attacks were carried out by
frustrated Sandinistas under the leadership of Pedro Joaquin Gonzales,
not by or under former guardsmen. And while it is true that former
national guardsmen played a major role in founding and leading the
Honduras-run FDN, the maximum number of guardsmen in the
contras was only about four hundred ... and this four hundred in-
cluded far more soldiers than officers ... peasants. . . were the over-
whelming majority of the Contras . . .
In
the American media and in academic writings it was often said that
Nicaragua Gust like Cuba) was "pushed into the arms" of the Soviet
Union by the misguided policies and relentless hostility of the United
States. To the contrary, the authors argue, "the most important thing the
Sandinistas shared with Fidel Castro and cultivated under his direct and
indirect influence was his bitter anti-American sentiment .... "
American idealists supported the Sandinistas because of their convic–
tion that they were deeply committed to egalitarian policies. Evidence to
the contrary was either unavailable or ignored, including the predilection
of the Sandinista leaders for Mercedes cars and their expropriation of the
luxurious homes of the rich immediately after taking power in 1979:
After July 1979 aU sorts of property throughout the country .. . be–
came war booty . . . distributed according to power and prestige
within the Sandinista movement. An enormous horde of riches was
left by the Somozas and their closest friends . .. Almost all of it fell
into the hands of high members of the FSLN, especially the nine
commandantes ...
Following the loss of power after the 1990 election, one Mexican
journalist estimated that the Sandinistas took over some $700 million in
state property that included automobiles, radio transmitters, shops, facto–
ries, hotels, restaurants, travel agencies, huge ranches, amusement parks,
and export-import businesses, among other things.
Miranda and Ratliff also detail the assistance the Sandinistas rendered
to other Latin American guerrillas, especially in the neighboring countries
of El Salvador and Guatemala - a policy that was stubbornly denied and
fervently disputed by their supporters abroad.
In
fact, Managua provided
hospitality to representatives and organizers of the guerrilla movements in
Argentina, Columbia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Uruguay and oth-
