102
PARTISAN REVIEW
Friedrich Nietzsche is, with little doubt, the most important philo–
sophical influence on the various versions of relativism, perspectivism,
fictionalism, subjectivism, and aestheticism that have recently been
gathered under the umbrella of "postmodernism" (as Geha and many
others have acknowledged). Yet it is interesting to note how narrow the
postmodernist appropriation of Nietzsche can be, how it tends to ignore
certain aspects of this kaleidoscopic thinker.
Certainly there is no doubt about Nietzsche's perspectivist inclina–
tions. They are clearly stated in his firm and continuing opposition to
Platonism and all forms of essentialism, which he defined as the "idle hy–
pothesis" that "things possess a constitution in themselves quite apart from
interpretation and subjectivity." In a passage from
The Will to Power
Nietzsche criticizes the hypothesis that "interpretation and subjectivity are
not essential, that a thing freed from all relationships would still be a
thing." At times his views did lead him to advocate attitudes reminiscent
of the kind of relativism and skepticism that Schafer and Geha recom–
mend. For example, he favored "unbelief as an instinct" and "an absolute
skepticism toward all inherited concepts" and toward the
"anthropomorphic error" whereby the mind identifies its own constructs
with reality itself. In
The Genealogy of Morals
Nietzsche states, "There is
only
a perspective seeing, only a perspective 'knowing'." Therefore, "the
more
eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe," the more complete our
vision will be. In
The Gay Science
he glorifies the free spirit
par excellence,
the person who would "take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty,
being practiced on maintaining himself on insubstantial ropes and
possibilities and dancing even near abysses."
Yet despite these polemics and this hyperbole, Nietzsche was far from
being a wholehearted proponent of such relativist tendencies. He may
have believed that truth was more created than discovered, but this did
not prevent him from recognizing that it is usually necessary to
believe
one
is discovering something in order to make the effort of creating it. As far
as I can tell, this point has escaped the advocates of a postmodernist style
of psychoanalysis, who simply assume their patients will be as enthused as
they are by the prospect of embarking on some kind of aesthetic,
relativistic, or deconstructive game.
One can certainly understand the appeal these latter approaches might
have for a certain kind of psychoanalyst, perhaps frustrated with the
sedentary and distinctly passive nature of his or her work, possibly
growing bored with the tedium of the Oedipus complex and the no less
predictable formulae of the more recent schools. To such a person,
donning the mantle of the creative artist or the aesthete might be a
welcome and rather flattering prospect.
