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from the style alone. Similarly, efforts by Carol Gilligan and others to
show that women value differently - value caring more than justice, for
example - have been inconclusive. There are abundant examples of
women who care passionately about justice - from the "equal pay for
equal work" movement to the advocacy of the right
to
choose and of
ownership over one's own body.
Even if most women and only some men value caring more than
rights, or act cooperatively rather than competitively, or use conversa–
tion to establish relationships rather than to assert positions, do the
transformationist theses follow? Feminists themselves are not sure how
to
interpret the results. Are the "feminine" traits inherent in being female,
or are they social products? The former view, which is sometimes called
"essentialism," provides clear support
to
the idea that gender determines
identity and interests, but it is difficult to support in the absence of per–
fect uniformity among women, and it contradicts the transformationist
belief in the social construction of the self. But if "feminine" traits are
social products, a number of questions arise. Are they constructions by
and in the interest of the dominant class, or by and in the interest of
women? Are they stereotypes to be fought - "I have a right to be as
competitive as I want to be," says the liberal feminist - or traits
to
be
embraced and asserted? "Not if you want to be true to yourself and
women everywhere," replies the radical. If the self is socially constructed,
and it is only a sexist society that makes men and women different, then
why cannot each individual choose his or her own identity?
Sometimes transformationists base the thesis that all ideas are political
on the claim that no judgment is totally immune from interest, values, or
purposes. But this argument rests on a non sequitur. The idea that judg–
ments involve values and purposes does not imply that they are politically
loaded or used to give one group power over another. The values could
include, after all, such ideals as objectivity and impartiality.
Empirically, it would appear that people quite often set aside or rise
above their interests. People do not appear to hold only those beliefs
that support their group's interests. It would take very strong arguments
to show that we should discount or disbelieve the empirical evidence.
Instead, transformationists provide arguments that either rest on equivo–
cation or validly support only weaker claims. They do, of course, present
many detailed interpretations that unmask interests lurking within the
most apparently disinterested texts and institutions. Even if one credits
these interpretations, it is not clear why they are taken as proof that all
beliefs are based on interests rather than as steps toward objectivity. If it
is discovered, for example, that the generic use of "man" to stand for all
human beings suppresses women, the decision to use "persons" instead
seem.s to be a move toward a disinterested fairness and impartiality. The
