382
PARTISAN REVIEW
tion, or changes of the political regime within one party such as that
which took place in Serbia, had a disastrous effect upon the process of
reform throughout Yugoslavia.
It
delayed the beginning of the process of
reform towards democracy in the other republics and from the outset
gave these reforms a powerful push in the reverse direction. . . . Since it
was national Communists who were in charge, that is, Communists who
based their collectivism on the concept of the nation and nationalist ide–
ology, it meant that the national and nationalist questions had to be the
main issue from the outset." In such a situation, the idea of developing a
civil society and a democratic culture didn't have much of a chance, even
without a war, and war has only made it more difficult. If the idea of "the
nation" becomes the leading idea of one society, then every civil right
based on the individual becomes less important, put on the back burner
until "better times." During periods of national homogenization, a person
is no longer judged by profession, age, education, or political affiliation,
but is reduced to the lowest common denominator - the nation - to the
point that being a Croat (or a Serb) literally becomes one's destiny.
By
stripping the individual of everything personal and reducing him to a
member of a nation, a nationalist society becomes a mass society. In con–
trast, in developing a democracy, the individual must be given the right to
make changes in political and social life. This is why nationalism and
democracy do not belong together.
In Croatia, nationalism that erases
all
personal differences and survives
on the hatred of others is confused with patriotism, which is in fact the
freedom to love your country in the best way that you as an individual
can. This is the juncture at which, in the best manner of the old
Bolsheviks, the production of enemies began. As if it is not enough to
have outside enemies, such as the Serbs, the "good" fundamentalist
Croats began to search for, and in their feverish search to produce, so–
called "inside enemies." Upon Croatia's acceptance into the United
Nations last spring, President Franjo Tudjman gave a triumphant and sup–
posedly historical speech about the "fulfillment of a thousand-year-old
dream of the Croatian people" to have their own independent state.
True, the occasion was historical, but his speech was not. The President
could not restrain himself from pointing out - or better, from warning
his
nation - that its perfect unity had been spoiled by "a fistful of sold-out
scoundrels." This is how he labeled intellectuals who dared to disagree,
and in public, with some of the things the government says or does. In a
way, he had already inaugurated the atmosphere of a witch-hunt when, a
year before, he gave an interview explaining who the "good guys" were:
"It
is clear who deserves the name of
intelligentsia,
those who are the bear–
ers of national spirit and self-determination." All others, he said, are