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THOMAS NOWOTNY
wanting to receive certain goods via the political process, often have
found them either outlandishly expensive, inferior, or both. Further
economic - and with it societal - progress will thus depend on whether
or not this resistance can be overcome. Thus, those interested in progress
and change, the reformist and left parties in Europe, must support this
political goal. Public relations and propaganda cannot break that resis–
tance, if only because up until now, the public sector has been statist and
autocratic, and public servants have behaved like rulers dealing with sub–
jects. This style does not correspond to the new social reality, where
subjective elements like emotions and perceptions are increasingly domi–
nant; and where individuality and self-expression are increasingly ac–
cepted. The private economy has done so; civil servants have not.
It
might also be useful to leave more of the public services to some sort of
markets. Market competition tends to keep politics and political elites
flexible and attentive to shifting "demands." The best of political parties
would have become the worst had it been permitted what public bu–
reaucracies have been permitted to do - namely to rule unchallenged for
several generations. Why not expand what is the rule in politics to the
public sector? Why not introduce competition for the "customers" and
corresponding penalties for those who fail in that competition? Joseph
Schumpeter spoke of "creative destruction" wrought by competition.
This is the source of progress in the private sector. Public institutions too
should be allowed to fail; they might be forced into failure if they do
not efficiently meet certain societal goals.
There are two visions of such a market in the public realm. One
would permit the wealthy to purchase what they want, and would leave
the less wealthy without vote. This kind of market for public services of
course would be unacceptable. The other one would allocate the same
"purchasing power" to every citizen in order to influence the behavior
of the "competitors." In this market, citizens would be given the chance
to "shop around." This would not only keep the public institutions on
the watch for
f~ar
of losing customers but would provide also an exten–
sion of democratic rights through increased possibilities to choose among
options. In Austria, for instance, everyone is granted a certain pension as
if by governmental decree. What if the prospective pensioner were
al–
lowed to choose between a lower pension at an earlier age or a higher
one later on in his or her life or to choose among various other public
sector pension schemes? One could also proceed further by establishing a
sector that is neither strictly "private" nor strictly "public." It is claimed
that such an autonomous sector already exists. Activities in that sector are
stimulated by "mixed motives" - motives that are neither clearly
"political" nor clearly "private" and narrowly "economic," but allow
for maximizing material payoffs. Voluntary fire brigades in Austria, for
