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PARTISAN REVIEW
about which one opines and not on the attitude of the person
formulating the opinion. Whether it is a matter of simple opinion or
certain knowledge, in both cases Plato assumed that logic and intellectual
honesty prevail. The difference springs from the fact that certain knowl–
edge is derived from things that lend themselves to irrefutable demonstra–
tion, whereas opinion roams through regions where all we can do is
collect a bundle of likelihoods. It is nonetheless true that an opinion,
even when merely plausible and bereft of absolute certainty, can (or can–
not) be forged in as rigorous a manner as possible on the basis of an
honest examination of all accessible data . Conjecture is not the same as
arbitrary judgment. It requires no less probity, no less exactitude, no less
erudition than science. On the contrary, conjecture may require even
more, given that the virtue of prudence constitutes its principal safeguard.
Respect for the truth - or at least its imperfect approximation - and
the wish to use the information at our disposal in an honest manner
spring from personal inclinations that are quite independent of the state
of contemporary science. [n all probability the percentage of human be–
ings possessing such inclinations was not appreciably smaller in prescien–
tific periods than it is today. Or rather, one would like to know if the
existence in our present-day world of a definite standard of certain (that
is, scientific) knowledge has necessarily resulted in the appearance among
us of a higher percentage of persons inclined to think rationally. Before
hazarding an answer to this question , let us simply remind ourselves that
in any case far and away the largest number of issues about which con–
temporary mankind forms its convictions and takes its decisions belongs
to the conjectural sector of human thought and not to the scientific
one. We nevertheless enjoy a considerable superiority over those who
lived before us, for in this same conjectural sector we can exploit a
wealth of information that was unknown to them. Thus, quite apart
from the advantages of science, our chances are greater than ever, in
other fields as well, of arriving at what Plato called "true opinion" -
that is, of conjecture which, although not based on a binding demon–
strability, is nonetheless correct. But do we profit as much as we should
from such opportunities? On the answer to this question depends the
survival of our civilization.
