MANES SPERBER
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action or a paralyzing despair? Both could be encountered - simultane–
ously, side by side, or in rapid succession. As I have said, hundreds of
thousands were ready to fight even without any prospect of victory, and
under certain circumstances they might have swept along those millions
who, without realizing it, were waiting for a sign that would be more
convincing than the endless nonsense from the bigmouths. The Social
Democrats and the politically unaffiliated also wanted something to be
done over the heads of the Party's leadership, something that might unite
the split camp again.
Thus it was possible to harbor the boldest hopes one moment and
despair again the next. The events that followed one another in ever
more rapid succession seemed easy to interpret and yet boggled the mind.
Was the world to be greeted with a hopeful "Good morning!" or to be
cursed with an angry "Good night"? Again and again the long conver–
sations, which frequently dragged on until after midnight, ended with the
cautious confidence that on the next day Moscow would finally aban–
don its catastrophically wrong line and order an immediate alliance with
the SPD and the unions. That day never dawned, and the two parties
were at each other's throats as they rushed into the same misfortune.
I don't remember the exact day in January which brought the
equally sensational and incredible news that the government had permit–
ted a parade of Nazi troops on Bulowplatz on Sunday the 22nd of the
month. All over Germany it was known that the KPD had its headquar–
ters at the Karl Liebknecht House on that square. Its facade was usually
covered with giant banners and portraits of leaders, and whenever there
was a suitable occasion, blood-red flags with hammer and sickle were
raised. There was a rumor that this building was really a fortress with se–
cret subterranean passages and gun emplacements. In point of fact, how–
ever, the best protection of the Karl Liebknecht House was afforded by
its neighbors, the vast majority of whom were tried-and-tested Commu–
nists. What was the purpose of that provocation, then? Was Chancellor
Schleicher, the political general whose shrewdness had caused him to be
vastly overrated, gambling on the bloody clash that he was forcing on
the provoked Communists, and did he expect it to weaken Hitler's rep–
utation and prevent Hindenburg from entrusting him with the formation
of a new government? Schleicher was not the only person who was
convinced that the Communists would do absolutely anything to deny
the Nazis access to Bulowplatz. The general may have counted on being
able to mobilize both the police and the Reichswehr [federal army] in
this case, and he may have hoped that their successful employment would
prove to Hindenburg and the men behind him that only he, Schleicher,
was in a position to use the army to prevent a civil war, restore law and
