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PARTISAN REVIEW
generals, staff, and potential heirs began jockeying-for position, usually cre–
ating a period of increasing instability which often culminated in a full-scale
crisis after the emperor's death. Something similar had occurred after the
death ofMao Tse-tung. Deng Xiaoping had set out to avoid this pattern. He
had maneuvered his fellow octogenarians into full or partial retirement, ele–
vating a 'younger' generation (mainly in its sixties) to power, but appeared
unwilling to give up having the final say on every important policy decision.
In 1987 he had engineered the removal of his long-time protege and desig–
nated heir, Hu Yaobang, when the latter had acted too independently and
with too much willingness to see economic reform extended into politics. Of
course he was to do the same in 1989.
Beyond the specifics of Deng's power, students commented on the av–
erage age ofthe party elite as itself an indication of China's failure to mod–
ernize. They felt this keenly, as it meant that they would have to wait
decades following the dictates of their elders rather than their hearts or
minds-before they could have a substantial voice in the highest levels of pol–
icy-making. This was one of the sources of Gorbachev's popularity. Not only
was the Soviet leader relatively young, he appeared to listen to and promote
still younger voices. A bit of the same had happened in China, to be sure. A
few younger economists, especially, had been catapulted to great prominence.
AWestern graduate education in some cases helped to overcome youth and
rapidly accelerate a career.
In the spring of 1989, a few people went beyond raising questions
about the age of party leaders, and beyond wondering about who would
succeed Deng. Perhaps, they suggested, China was experiencing not just a
succession of emperors but of dynasties. Perhaps the communist regime
would turn out to be just one of China's short-lived dynasties, a reign of
decades like the Sui or Yuan rather than of a thousand years as the tradi–
tional benediction has it. Chinese dynasties are thought to have a natural life
course: strong and sometimes expanding in their youth, stable and peaceful
in
middle age, increasingly prone to crises and instability as they grow old. Was
communism growing old?
Most students had little sense that any short-term changes were going
to end the People's Republic ofChina. The majority did not even contemplate
overturning the Communist Party. They did however see the government
as weakening. And whether the succession crisis was large or small, it
seemed to playa significant role. The ordinary work of the government was
hampered by loss of discipline, increasing corruption, and the distraction of
factional struggles. The latter were not just between "hardliners" and
"reformers" but among a wide range of different groups. While most such
groups had ideological positions, these were not necessarily their basis. Many
