RAYMOND ARON
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political form that has witnessed the highest regard from the com–
munity is liberal democracy . It takes the resolution to reason with
others to the extreme; it is the prototype of 'indirect action.'" And
again, "Liberalism is the supreme generosity; it is the right that the
majority grants to the minorities; it is the most noble appeal on the
planet. It supports its resolution to live in common with the enemy
and, what is more, with a weak enemy." Ortega adds that the coun–
tries where opposition exists are fewer and fewer. Half a century
later , this morose statement is still true.
At this point, a question arises: since Ortega did not base his
ideas on abstract principles, outside of history, how can he base on
history a liberalism that the masses tolerate less and less?
If
the
masses mortally hate what they are not, how will coexistence with
the enemy, and the respect of the adversary , survive the domination
of the masses? The philosopher, it seems to me, does not guarantee
the future : "historical reason" doesn't prophesy ; it seizes the original–
ity of situations , and it formulates the questions . It strives to
distinguish between the royal voice and the impasses. The liberalism
of the nineteenth century is not condemned or rejected in the
dungeons of history through the rise of "social" conscience in the
community. Representative institutions have not become anachro–
nistic because the masses lay direct claim to sovereign power.
Parliamentary democracy does not contradict the general proposi–
tion that all societies are aristocratic, insofar as they allow a minority
to inspire or rule. Representative institutions depend on the political
elite. The latter formulates the questions it poses to the people; it of–
fers the choice between rival parties. The ballot determines the man–
ner of choice , the model of decisive rule that often determines the
success or failure of the regime itself.
A classical objection arises. Since history is the absolute, how
could it dictate values , since one or the other bearers of opposing
values find themselves in an "unyielding combat," as Max Weber
said. "Does history itself permit discrimination between the gods at
war?"
If
I understand Ortega correctly, his simplified answer would
be: historical reason is not narration but interpretation and discrimi–
nation. Indirect action prevails over direct action because the latter
implies violence and transgresses the rules elaborated through time,
which have blended into civilization . To those who prefer violence to
civiliza tion, historical reason does not oppose a categorical impera–
tive , positive or negative , but to those who consent to look, it reveals
the vitality, the creation, the conviviality. Having discarded on-
